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THE CIA -- BECOMING A POPULAR EDITORIAL
SUBJECT

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.VA.)
25 January 1980

Editorials

Let's Not Restore Part of the Problem

Good heavens, Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is part of the problem. We are startled by your suggestion that it can be a solution.

Jimmy Carter's suggestion that the nation's intelligence agencies are somehow being thwarted in their data-gathering role flawed an otherwise acceptable State of the Union address Wednesday night and doubtless scared a good many listeners, including us.

Both official and private sentiment might very well prevent the CIA from resuming a policy calling for "dirty tricks" such as poisoning Fidel Castro's cigars, bribing of Italian government officials and returning Mideast tyrants to their thrones. But neither sentiment nor long-needed congressional oversight inhibits the agency in any way as it carries out the function given it in its charter — the gathering of intelligence.

The president's allusion to an intelligence apparatus held prisoner by unnamed villains sounded suspiciously like the assertions of that little band of right wing zealots who saw no danger in a secret society with unlimited pow-

er and unlimited resources. We regret that the president cannot show his determination to stand up to the Russians without pandering to those who would defend democracy with the tools of totalitarianism.

It would be a shame to surrender freedom while trying to preserve freedom. It took a long time to curb the excesses of the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is our sincere hope that the unhappy circumstances in which the nation finds itself will not stampede Congress into removing the restraints under which these agencies now act.

As for the president's speech as a whole, it was commendable. Not a bugle call, it was a resolute affirmation of the nation's new-found attitude toward aggression by the Soviet Union in an area where America's interests are vital. We are not as disturbed as some are by the prospect of war. We suspect the Russians are less interested in capturing oil than in forestalling trouble from resurgent Islam and that Carter's firm pronouncements will be considered carefully in Moscow.

ORANGEBURG TIMES DEMOCRAT (S. C.)
19 January 1980

Proper Role Of CIA

The fundamental difference of opinion over the proper role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in our system of government has resurfaced in the disagreement between one-time CIA Director Richard Helm and two of his successors, William Colby and Stanfield Turner, its present head. In testimony before Congress, Mr. Helm objected to open publication of even "sanitized" reports. The other two declared that the CIA should keep the public informed by increasing its publishing activities.

We agree that the public needs to know as much as possible about any question on which a government decision is being made. We do not agree that the CIA, or any other agency of government, should provide this information. The CIA should not be an information gathering agency. Non-

governmental groups including news organizations can do the job better and cheaper. Facts can be collected from open sources, with the government paying for the service if necessary, then turned over to scholars for analysis.

This is the overt function which the CIA has taken on. The proper role for the CIA is the collection of intelligence which must come from covert sources. How the intelligence is collected and from and by whom properly should not be public information.

The CIA needs to be reduced in size. Its overt activities should be contracted for with non-government information suppliers. A smaller, more responsible covert organization would remain which its sole customer, the President, should manage closely and carefully.

ROCKY MOUNT TELEGRAM (N. C.)
19 January 1980

'Reforms' Cripple CIA

Despite assurances from the administration that U.S. intelligence operations are adequate, the crisis in Iran and a string of other U.S. foreign policy setbacks indicate that U.S. intelligence capabilities have been "degraded to such an extent" that they are no longer an effective arm of U.S. foreign policy.

That's the assessment of security analysts writing on the intelligence gap in the current issue of National Security Record.

The analysts blame the breakdown on the internal reforms within the Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1970s and the external exposures and resulting limitations placed on the agency in the late 1970s in the wake of congressional investigations.

These reforms resulted in the forcible retirement of some 2,000 mostly senior officers, and the discharge of another 820 officers from the super-secret Deputy Directorate of Operations, which is responsible for covert actions.

Throughout the post-war era the U.S. has relied upon foreign intelligence activities to support U.S. interests overseas. Clandestine collection, counterintelligence and covert operations have all been essential elements of the U.S. intelligence effort.

Yet today, as at no other time there is a growing consensus that U.S. intelligence capabilities have

been degraded to such an extent that the U.S. is increasingly incapable of carrying on intelligence activities.

In addition to Iran, which caught this country totally off guard, there are several other examples of intelligence failures.

U.S. intelligence consistently misinterpreted the intent of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. Downgrading of intelligence capabilities led to a failure to monitor the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, and Cuba's support of revolution throughout Latin America.

In 1973, U.S. intelligence inaccurately predicted that Israel would not be attacked by the Arabs.

More recently, underestimating North Korean troop strength by 25 percent led to President Carter having to reverse his previously-announced troop withdrawal policy.

The U.S. has been unable to confirm whether a nuclear explosion actually occurred over the Indian Ocean last September, and if so, who was responsible.

This country was not able to anticipate the rapid shift of Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia.

In 1977 the CIA revised its intelligence estimates on Soviet oil production, concluding that Moscow would be a net oil importer through the 1980s. Yet the Defense Intelligence Agency, and many Western petroleum experts, disagree with these estimates.

HARRISBURG NEWS (PA.)
24 January 1980

U.S. intelligence could use a break

A NEW STUDY of the Central Intelligence Agency by two Georgetown University professors concludes that a 1974 law effectively precludes any U.S. covert action abroad because of the requirement that eight committees of Congress must be informed about all such operations.

The study, "The CIA and the American Ethic," was written by Ernest W. Lefever and Roy Godson, both professors of government at Georgetown, and published by the Ethics and Public Policy Center. The authors claim that a 1974 law and its Hughes-Ryan amendment was a reaction to horror stories about assassination plots, drug experiments and the like, and was enacted without a fully informed debate as to the implications of briefing up to 200 senators and congressmen on covert operations.

"As a practical matter," the authors note, "this means that about 25 staff members also share in the information. And, under the rules of the two houses, any individual member who wants to know about such operations may have access to the information as well." By deliberately leaking the story, any lawmaker can effectively veto any piece of covert action of which he disapproves, sometimes at the danger of life and limb to those who have been engaged in it.

Thus, since 1974 CIA operations have been largely reduced to collecting bits and pieces of information. The authors call for changes in the law that will greatly reduce the number of individuals that must be informed unless the United States has determined that "covert action has become a thing of the past."

WHILE the United States ought never to return to the unstructured and irresponsible "good-old days" when almost anything passed muster as covert action, the current law needs modifying. The new situations in Iran, Afghanistan and the entire Middle East require a capacity to deal with some problems by methods that go beyond reading the foreign press. If fire is to be fought with fire, secrecy must be maintained except for the very few with a genuine need to know.

Even our ability to infiltrate has been shackled as Stansfield Turner, CIA chief, notes:

"The intelligence community in particular is out of business unless it can ensure a large degree of confidentiality in what it does. The Soviet who passes his delegation's change in negotiating strategy to us, the agent who can become a member of a terrorist organization and thereafter keeps us informed of its plans, the allied intelligence agencies who work with us to watch and thwart international drug trafficking — none will take the obvious risks if we cannot guarantee their anonymity."

The near-massacre of the CIA in the wake of former profligacy has resulted in misinformation, misinterpretation and impotency in situations fraught with danger for us. Skilled employees have left, morale has faded and President Carter has expressed his dissatisfaction. Congress needs to rewrite its panic legislation of 1974 by narrowing the disclosure requirements and adopting a new CIA charter now under consideration in both houses.

TROY TIMES RECORD (N. Y.)
20 January 1980

Don't handcuff the CIA

Senator Walter Huddleston, Kentucky Democrat who heads the Senate Committee on intelligence charters, makes a pair of important points in discussing the new charter for the Central Intelligence Agency which will be offered Congress and the White House for approval.

The Kentucky Democrat says the existing rules under which the CIA must operate, while far stricter than previous regulations, do not "totally hamstring agency operations." At the same time, Senator Huddleston says whatever the new charter does it should not allow the CIA to go back to "the good old days."

In trying to reach a compromise between those who feel the nation has been hurt by putting handcuffs on the CIA and those

who feel any loosening of controls would threaten civil liberties, congressional conferees will be inclined toward less stringent controls by growing public apprehension over what is perceived as intelligence failures in both Iran and Afghanistan.

The ideal charter will guarantee that the CIA must operate under rigid supervision from select Senate and House committees and the President but that its operations will be protected from the kind of leaks and disclosures certain to render operations useless. The present situation in which not two but eight committees of Congress oversee CIA operations certainly should be dropped. It is hardly conducive to even the minimal secrecy required.

HOUSTON CHRONICLE
17 January 1980

Free CIA to do its work

If not for their disturbing propaganda value internationally, recent Russian accusations of CIA subterfuge in the world's hot spots could almost be considered laughable. Regrettably, "laughable" is the term many intelligence insiders in this country fall back on in describing the CIA's ability to do its crucial work.

A report by the private Institute for Study of Conflict released this week went so far as to say that self-inflicted wounds to American intelligence gathering capabilities already have jeopardized the interests of the entire Free World. Even more frightening is its conclusion that the Soviets, meanwhile, have systematically expanded and polished their own operations.

The root cause of this "intelligence crunch" is plain enough: For the past several years the CIA has been hamstrung — by a myriad of post-Vietnam, post-Watergate disclosure requirements. This once-independent (and highly effective) agency now must explain many of its "secret" operations to no less than eight congressional committees. Counting congressional staffers, some 150 sets of eager ears now are privy to many security plans before they leave the drawing boards. Some subterfuge that is, when a sensitive CIA mission can become grist for Washington cocktail party conversation before it is put into

effect. Far from being the "runaway rogue elephant" once described by Sen. Frank Church, the CIA is today more of a mouse, to the detriment of legitimate national security interests the world over.

Belatedly, in the wake of events in Iran and Afghanistan, the Carter administration is awakening to the sad state of U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities. An administration-led campaign on Capitol Hill now is being waged for repeal of the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment, which requires wide disclosure of CIA plans to Congress. Under a proposed CIA charter offered by the administration, the CIA would be accountable to only two congressional committees rather than the present eight. Those two would both be intelligence committees, where security is considered to be more effective.

The administration's campaign is an overdue recognition of painfully apparent facts: With demand for public accountability the CIA has been demoralized and paralyzed while Russian intelligence, unhampered by cries for public explanations, has been free to operate around the world.

It is encouraging to see that the administration has finally been galvanized into action. The Congress should act without delay to free the CIA to do its work.

THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
6 February 1980

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 4

Hal Gulliver

Regrooming And Regreening CIA

The pendulum almost always swings back, and it is doing so with a vengeance in relation to the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is ironic. Many of those in the Congress who did their share to demoralize and undercut the CIA are now among those who deplore our failure to have better intelligence on Iran and Afghanistan, our inability to conduct "covert" intelligence operations.



Legislation is currently pending in the Congress to further stake out exactly what kind of intelligence operation we want this country to have. Americans are ambivalent on such matters. We rejoice in spy stories and spy movies, even the wondrous plastic heroes of the James Bond school, where the women are always conveniently beautiful and the villains always agreeably terrible. But Americans, a great many at least, seem outraged that the CIA in the world might have taken part in overthrowing

a government or two, or in killing real people, or in scheming to influence the political factions within particular countries.

The crux of the current debate over the CIA is probably accountability.

There is considerable reason to think that even presidents have not always known exactly what the CIA was doing in some covert operations. Perhaps the truth is more complex; that presidents have not always wanted to know, certainly not in detail, what was involved in some intelligence projects.

But the pendulum swings. There is a warlike mood abroad in the land, a realization that the Cold War days have not evaporated, an understanding that the Soviet Union is capable of sending troops into another country and taking it over, as the Soviets did in Afghanistan.

What kind of CIA do we want?

The mood shifts. The cry now is that we must have a better intelligence operation, a more effective one; yes, an intelligence apparatus capable of those covert operations. There is probably a consensus on that. But how far should such operations go? Overthrow governments? Murder politi-

cal leaders? There is probably on the whole a consensus against the more extreme ventures. There is too a new consensus on accountability, that ultimately the president of the United States must know and take responsibility.

There is no end to the tricky areas: A 1974 law requires that the congressional foreign relations committees and other "appropriate" committees be informed of any covert actions. That translates into saying that fully 100 members of Congress (add to that at least one staffer per member) must be informed of the most secret kind of CIA projects. As a practical matter, a secret known by that many people will never be secret long. The law is likely to be repealed this year, redefined so that only the intelligence committees will be informed of covert actions. That probably still means telling too many people.

Should the CIA pledge flatly never to use journalists, clergymen, or academics as paid intelligence agents? They should so pledge, in my view, but responsible folk argue strongly in the other direction. That issue too will come up for congressional action this year. Accountability, in any event. That is the critical part.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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THE ECONOMIST
2-8 February 1980

CIA

Time to unclip its wings—a bit

One measure of the shift in public opinion since the reformist days that followed Vietnam and Watergate is the new respect given to the Central Intelligence Agency. Far from being the dirtiest three-letter word in the language, CIA now spells "good thing" and is to be encouraged. Thus President Carter, in his state-of-the-union address last week, wanted the removal of "unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence and to tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information". No sooner had he said this than seven senators, led by Mr Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, brought forward a bill designed to give the CIA much greater freedom to counter Soviet activity. And Representative Robert McClory of Illinois introduced a similar bill in the house of representatives.

The main restraint upon the CIA is the 1974 law known as the Hughes-Ryan amendment. This obliges the agency to get presidential approval in advance for most covert operations and to notify eight congressional committees with some 200 members before, or soon after, they get under way. The two bills would, quite sensibly, require the CIA to report to only two committees—the house and senate intelligence committees, which together have just 29 members—a change also called for by President Carter in his proposed new charter for the CIA. There is likely to be disagreement, however, about when the committees should be informed: before clandestine work is under way or merely as soon as possible?

Mr Moynihan's bill would also make it a crime to reveal the name of any United States intelligence agent. This measure is primarily aimed at the former CIA man, Mr Philip Agee, who has disclosed the names of several of his ex-colleagues; but because of the way it is worded, it might at the same time restrict the freedom of the press. More controversial, however, is the proposal to exempt the CIA and other intelligence agencies from most of the Freedom of Information Act.

Since it was passed in 1974, this act, which makes available most public docu-

ments to anyone who asks to see them, has been used to find out a great deal about the uses and abuses of the CIA. Files on the CIA's experiments with drugs, its research into modifying human behaviour, its surveillance activities, its "destabilisation" of Allende's Chile and its attempts at assassination have all come to light. Mr James Schlesinger, the former director of the CIA, has used the act to get information for a book on the agency; it is said that communist countries, through their embassies in Washington, have used it for less reputable purposes. But there is no proof that any serious harm has been done; the act, after all, protects documents whose disclosure would damage national security.

The cards are undoubtedly stacked too heavily against the CIA at present: it is impossible for an intelligence agency to be effective if it must advertise all its exotic activities widely in advance. But there is no reason why the agency should not be both workable and accountable—the aim of the president's proposed charter. Mr Moynihan says he wants a charter to be adopted. But many fear that the passage of his bill would bury it. That would be a pity!

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (MO.)
29 January 1980

Why Unhandcuff The CIA?

Record Indicates More Controls, Not Fewer, Are Needed

An Editorial In *The Philadelphia Inquirer*

It comes as no surprise that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the prolonged unpleasantness in Iran has provoked moves to "unhandcuff" the Central Intelligence Agency. Now the White House and the Senate Intelligence Committee reportedly are close to agreement on legislation to give the CIA "more flexibility," as committee Chairman Walter Huddleston of Kentucky put it, to deal with those situations and others that might occur.

The legislation would "modify" the 1974

**mirror
of public
opinion**

Hughes-Ryan amendment requiring the CIA to report covert overseas operations for purposes other than intelligence gathering to eight congressional committees — the Senate and House committees on

Intelligence, Armed Services and Appropriations the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It would reduce the number to two, the Intelligence committees in each chamber.

Also, drawing from a formal charter defining and limiting the CIA's role that the administration has been working on since 1977, the proposal would eliminate the requirement that the president personally approve all covert operations. Instead, his approval would be required only for those judged, presumably by the CIA itself, to carry a high political risk.

It also would tighten provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, which requires considerable previously secret information to be made public. Arguing that these are a boon to foreign governments, Sen. Huddleston, in agreement with the administration, proposes to restrict the right of American citizens to file requests for personal data about themselves.

Does the CIA need "more flexibility" in light of developments in Iran and Afghanistan? Let's look at the record. A Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities spent 15 months doing just that and concluded that what the CIA needed was more controls and less secrecy.

The committee, in its report of April 1976, found a history of failures, from the Bay of Pigs to the secret war in Laos and the secret bombing of Cambodia, from the anti-Allende activities in Chile to Watergate and to the fiasco of covert operations in Angola — "all instances of the use of power cloaked in secrecy which when revealed provoked widespread popular disapproval." It found a record of abuses, from the 20-year program of opening citizens' mail to surreptitious drug experiments on Americans to

planned assassinations of foreign leaders.

For these and other abuses and failures the Senate committee spread the blame around impartially — to presidents, who made "excessive and at times self-defeating" use of covert operations, to the CIA, which all too often seemed to be conducting its own foreign policy, and to Congress, which "failed to exercise sufficient oversight, seldom questioning the use to which its appropriations were being put."

Obviously, there is an urgent need for better American intelligence. Iran is a case in point. The need for covert operations, though, is something else. The Senate committee rightly proposed that they be limited to the "most extraordinary circumstances," and be personally approved by the president.

As to congressional oversight, it may be that eight committees with a total of 163 members plus staffs are too many. Two committees are too few. A major reason for the failure of congressional oversight in the past was that the two intelligence committees, instead of watching the CIA, let themselves be co-opted by it.

Intelligence, by its nature, needs a great deal of secrecy, and there is an inherent conflict between that and the need for openness of a democratic society. But that is what our constitutional system of checks and balances exists for — to resolve conflicts in ways that protect needs and interests on all sides.



Congressional Oversight

LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (KY.)
20 January 1980

Congress should be cautious in easing rules on the CIA

PRESIDENT CARTER'S request that Congress ease its legal reins on CIA operations raises, again, the baffling question of how to protect a democracy without resorting to undemocratic means. What Mr. Carter wants, basically, is a retreat from some of the requirements that the CIA be accountable to elected officials — requirements Congress imposed in the mid-1970s to curb widely publicized CIA abuses.

The President's proposals are modest compared with the wide-ranging freedom some in Washington would grant the CIA after events in Iran and Afghanistan. Attitudes toward the CIA on Capitol Hill, especially in the House, have changed dramatically from the zeal for reform five years ago. The inclination now, among many lawmakers and political commentators, is to let the agency do whatever it deems necessary to protect U.S. interests in an increasingly hostile world.

Good work was overshadowed

Trouble is, much of this hostility toward the U.S. is due to covert operations — "dirty tricks" — by the CIA back in the days when it had almost limitless freedom. By helping overthrow elected governments in Iran in 1953 and in Chile in 1973, the CIA earned for the U.S. widespread distrust and a contempt for our preaching about self-government. The agency's snooping on U.S. citizens and plots to assassinate foreign leaders also blackened the CIA's reputation and overshadowed its genuine accomplishments in gathering and digesting foreign intelligence. (The CIA's gloomy assessments of the war in Vietnam, for instance, were far more accurate than those of the Pentagon.)

Mr. Carter presumably recognizes the danger of new abuses if the CIA is given a blank check. His proposals, at any rate, are limited. He is seeking: (1) repeal of the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment, requiring notification of eight different congressional committees when the CIA plans clandestine operations; (2) tightening of the Freedom of Information Act to curb foreign access to certain government data, and (3) relief from the requirement that the president personally approve even minor CIA covert operations.

The first of these requests is reasonable. There are too many chances for leaks and excessive delays when the CIA has to advise eight congressional committees. Notifying only the intelligence committees and leaders of both houses seems sufficient to ensure accountability.

Tightening the Freedom of Information Act is a trickier issue. The law already exempts classified material. What the administration is worried about is the release of once-secret information that has been declassified but that still may be damaging in the hands of a foreign power. The best solution to this problem is to take a harder look at classification and declassification procedures. Considering the government's tendency to overclassify information, and its failure, highlighted in *The Progressive* case, to keep what should be secret secret, the Freedom of Information Act should be the least of the administration's security worries.

But however Congress decides on the first two of Mr. Carter's requests, it should reject the third. Absolving presidents of responsibility to know about and approve covert operations, even minor and "safe" undertakings, would be a big mistake.

First, even what seems a minor operation could, if exposed, prove a big embarrassment. Precisely because of this danger, someone with political judgment and the broadest policy responsibility — in a word, the president — should be involved. A decision on meddling secretly in the affairs of another nation oughtn't be left to some middle-level CIA operative or even to the director of Central Intelligence.

Second, the rationale that a president should be able, truthfully, to deny responsibility for a potentially embarrassing CIA dirty trick just doesn't wash. Few, in this country or abroad, are likely to believe such a denial. And to the extent a denial is credible, Americans will want to know — have a right to know — who's running the show. We elect presidents to make

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tough, unpleasant decisions. And when they make mistakes, as John Kennedy did in okaying the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, we expect them to shoulder the blame, instead of shifting it to some faceless bureaucrat.

Obviously, the nation needs an effective intelligence service and on occasion may need covert operations. But the lessons we learned from CIA abuses mustn't be forgotten in an hysterical reaction to unsettling world events. Our strongest suit in the rough game of geopolitics, so long as the game stops short of a shooting war, is the credibility of our ideals.

These ideals look better than ever in light of Russia's cynical excuse for invading Afghanistan. Turning loose the CIA, as in the bad old days, would tell the world that our commitment to democracy extends no farther than our own shores.

BRIMINGHAM POST HERALD (ALA.)
15 January 1980

Unsnarling the CIA

In a sensible move worthy of support, the Carter administration is asking congressional leaders to ease too-tight curbs on covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Specifically, the White House seeks repeal of the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974. Adopted at the height of the furor over CIA misdeeds, it forces the administration to inform eight different congressional committees of its plans for clandestine operations.

This means that hundreds of lawmakers and aides would know about CIA secret moves in advance. In effect the law gives any one of them a veto, simply by leaking to the press. A covert operation that gets into the papers has to be scrubbed.

Because of fear of such exposure, the CIA has just about ended covert activities. Thus at a time when the Soviet Union is on the march, militarily and by subversion, the United States has handicapped itself.

The White House and Congress quietly are discussing a new charter for the CIA's activi-

ties. If the administration has its way, as it should, covert activities will have to be disclosed only to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

Both have a reputation for tight security and non-leaking. If the legislative change is made, the country will regain the ability to stage covert operations, subject to congressional oversight and presidential approval of politically risky actions.

In a related field, the administration would like to tighten up the Freedom of Information Act. Quite properly, this measure gives private citizens access to information that bureaucrats wish to hide.

Unfortunately, however, foreign governments have learned to use the act for their own benefit. The Communist bloc is gaining a great amount of classified secrets by exploiting the process.

Congress certainly should refine the act so that it protects the public's right to know while at the same time not giving hostile powers an intelligence windfall.

COLUMBUS DISPATCH (OHIO)
15 January 1980

CIA Restrictions Need Second Look

SECOND THOUGHTS are coming to the U.S. Congress which so overreacted to abuses by the Central Intelligence Agency it imposed restrictions severely damaging the CIA as an effective arm of this nation's foreign policy.

Efforts are under way to pass a much discussed new charter for the CIA which not only would make the agency accountable for high standards of behavior but return to it the ability to advise both Congress and the chief executive about the course of events abroad involving U.S. interests.

Within the last year, America seemingly was caught totally off-guard with reference to the germination of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet Union's incursion into Afghanistan.

Earlier, a tapering-off of espionage efforts in Cuba led to failure to fully monitor a Soviet military buildup there. An underestimation of North Korean troop strength led to reversal of President Carter's announced policy to reduce the

U.S. military ground presence in South Korea.

Explanation of a reported nuclear explosion off the tip of southern Africa is lacking. So is the reason for sharply revising Soviet oil production estimates along with the sudden shift of Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia.

Some of this dilemma can be attributed to the inexperience of the Carter administration. But the fact remains the 1974 "reform" action by Congress caused the forcible retirement of 2,000 mostly senior career CIA officers and the discharge of another 820 officers from the crucial Directorate of Operations which had been responsible for covert intelligence operations.

Too, Congress gave itself oversight power which makes secrecy within the CIA virtually impossible. Congress should have some selective oversight. The executive department should have final responsibility for operational orders.

Those ideals should be restored by Congress.

BRATTLEBORO REFORMER (VT.)
16 January 1980

Editorial

Unleashing The CIA

With the Russians kicking the sand of Afghanistan in Uncle Sam's face, there is inevitably going to be a lot of muscle-flexing in Washington and some of it is bound to affect the Central Intelligence Agency. This is not necessarily bad: It was an over-reaction to earlier abuses of the spy agency when Congress in 1974 passed an amendment requiring the spooks to inform no less than eight committees of Congress about their covert operations.

The Carter administration is now proposing that that amendment be repealed and that the CIA be required to inform just the House and Senate intelligence committees. The belief among the president's advisers is that exposure of covert plans to eight committees, with all the danger of information leaks, had a chilling effect on the CIA. Ideally, there would be just a joint intelligence committee, with membership changed frequently enough so that no congressmen become overly chummy with the CIA, as happened in its "rogue elephant" days.

If a change in that portion of the law does make sense, another section of that 1974 amendment should not be tampered with. This is the clause that requires presidential approval for all CIA covert operations before they go forward. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly wants to change this so that approval is needed only for projects that involve high political risk. It is hard to imagine, though, a clandestine CIA maneuver that would not be politically risky. The president should continue to sign off on all CIA missions outside the realm of conventional intelligence-gathering.

Iran is a casebook example of how CIA operations can go awry. For years, the CIA-engineered coup that unseated the government of Mohammed Mossadegh and put the former shah back on his Peacock Throne was held up by the CIA and its uncritical supporters as one of the agency's smoothest successes. With the hindsight of 25 years, it looks to be less so, as the opponents of the shah who have finally gained power bitterly blame the United States for its role in the shah's repression and corruption.

The other failing of the CIA in the Iranian situation is not its own fault: At the request of the shah, Washington forbade U.S. intelligence agents in Iran to establish any contact with the opposition groups. Their strength, their motives and finally their success came as a surprise to Washington and left the Carter administration ill-prepared to deal with the fall of what had been this country's surrogate policeman in the Persian Gulf.

In other regards, the CIA has performed well in the current crisis. President Carter was informed of Soviet military moves toward Afghanistan early enough so that he was able to get in a warning to the Kremlin before the intervention actually occurred. Obviously, the warning did little good, but its outright rejection by the Soviets made clear to Mr. Carter that sterner measures than he has previously invoked in altercations with Moscow will be required to keep it in line.

The CIA has also informed Washington about the oil shortage that looms in the Soviet Union for the mid-1980s and gives a portentous rationale for the Russian aggression in Southwest Asia. On balance, the CIA has acquitted itself well. Anyone who suggests that by "unleashing" it the United States can solve all its foreign-policy problems is either running too hard for president or spending too much time reading James Bond books, or both. At the same time, it is painfully clear in this tortured world that a government intelligence agency, serving this nation instead of its own interests as has been the case in the past, is an essential ingredient of national security.

SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (IND.)
16 January 1980

CIA hands tied

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan, coming at a time when the Central Intelligence Agency is still recovering from attempts to remedy its abuses, are reminders that this nation needs an effective intelligence service that is capable of competing with similar operations of other governments, including the Soviet Union.

The outrageous behavior of the CIA in the past brought on the restrictions that are crippling the agency's ability to mount secret operations.

One of the worst problems is the danger that covert operations will be exposed from the outset. Present law requires that the administration notify eight congressional committees of any plans of clandestine operations.

Changes in the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment that effectively clipped the wings of the CIA are reportedly being considered by the Carter administration. One change would require notification only of the two intelligence committees of Congress.

While the CIA invited the restrictions by its own activities,

including its corruption of private American business in an effort to overthrow the elected Salvador Allende government in Chile, the nation as well as the agency is the loser when necessary intelligence is lacking.

The Carter administration reportedly is moving slowly in proposing changes in the law, seeking the changes as part of a proposed charter setting out the powers and duties of the agency.

Also under consideration is another delicate issue, limits on the Freedom of Information Act, which foreign governments have used to get data on U.S. activities.

While the CIA must compete with agencies like the KGB, its powers and duties need to be set forth clearly so that it represents the values of a free and democratic nation. It should never again be allowed to operate virtually as a government unto itself.

The administration and Congress should balance the need for an effective intelligence agency with the need to prevent abuses as they draw up a charter for the agency.

FALL RIVER HERALD NEWS (MASS.)
17 January 1980

CIA restrictions

The President is asking Congress to agree to the relaxation of some of the restrictions imposed on the CIA during the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate period. The President has approached the subject cautiously, being perfectly aware that only a year or two ago such a request would have provoked an uproar both from Capitol Hill and the public at large.

Fortunately the climate of opinion has changed. Iran and Afghanistan have made most people aware that the CIA cannot be hobbled indefinitely by restrictions that probably should not have been imposed so rigidly in the first place.

These restrictions were intended to make it impossible for the "dirty tricks" of the Watergate era to be performed again. Certainly no one would wish to see a return to them, least of all the CIA itself.

On the other hand, the result

of the reaction to those "dirty tricks" has been a secret service which Congress has been determined to keep totally non-secret in its operations.

No one bothered to point out that a non-secret secret service is a contradiction in terms, possibly because the CIA itself in its title does not contain the word secret.

As time has passed, however, it has become only too obvious that the CIA cannot function efficiently with all its activities fully known to everyone, including those the organization is intended to guard the country against.

The Carter administration is now courteously and in a very low key trying to convince Congress of something which should be merely a matter of common sense.

We must all hope that Congress returns the CIA to the supervision of the White House where it belongs.

OMAHA WORLD HERALD (NEB.)
17 January 1980

Best Intelligence Needed

Time to Strengthen CIA

Following the unpleasant surprises of the past year in Iran and Afghanistan, there is a move afoot in Washington to remove some of the restraints on the CIA.

Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, D-Ky., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee's legislative subcommittee, put it this way:

"There's no question but that now there is lots of interest in Congress in doing something positive (for the intelligence community) as rapidly as possible.

"The perception in Congress and the country is that weak intelligence was responsible for our troubles in Iran and Afghanistan and elsewhere. I don't agree, but the events have provided a springboard for congressmen to make points in an election year by 'unleashing' the CIA."

We are not sure that "unleashing" is the best word for it, but this is what is being talked about in the White House and elsewhere in Washington:

- Repeal of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 which requires the CIA to report covert activities to eight congressional committees, consisting of more than 150 senators and representatives and their staffs. The proposal would reduce this to only two committees.

- Changes in the Freedom of Information Act to end abuses such as allowing enemy agents to obtain critical files from the CIA and FBI at taxpayer expense.

- Legislation to curtail the so-called "Agee abuses," named for Phillip Agee, former CIA employee who publishes the names of CIA agents serving abroad.

These three so-called "sweeteners" are expected to be brought before the Congress soon with a good chance of

passage, given the present political climate.

In addition, there is a comprehensive new charter for the CIA which has been extensively discussed by the administration and the Senate Intelligence Committee for months.

The charter would both further relax restrictions but make the CIA accountable under the law for higher standards of behavior than in the past.

One feature would require presidential approval for covert operations only when they were judged to carry high political risk. The charter has been criticized by conservatives as still imposing too many restrictions on the CIA.

Administration officials are optimistic the charter will be accepted by Congress this year and hope for earlier action on the "sweeteners."

The day when the CIA was likened by its critics to a "rogue elephant" running amuck through the forests of Washington is long gone. But the restraints placed on the CIA at that time are still there.

Most of these should be taken off as soon as possible. These are perilous times and our country needs the best intelligence-gathering system it can get. Restoring the CIA's efficiency and morale should have high priority.

HARTFORD COURANT
17 January 1980

Unleashing the CIA

The Carter administration has latched onto the intelligence failures in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as reason to loosen restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Carter and the CIA would abolish requirements that all covert activity be approved by the president. The administration is suggesting that the CIA report only to two congressional committees, instead of the eight, as is now required under the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment.

Their recommendations would alter the proposed CIA charter, now before the Senate Intelligence Committee. The charter is supposed to curb CIA abuses, such as the overthrow of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens and threats on the life of Fidel Castro.

Ironically, the government's failure to react sooner to Soviet troops in Cuba is now being used as an argument to renew the type of activity that outraged Congress in the early 1970s and led to today's reporting requirements. The Senate now is even considering approving the use of journalists and other civilians as paid agents.

The CIA should have learned in Iran and from the earlier Bay of Pigs fiasco that covert attempts to make governments rise and fall ultimately will backfire.

The Carter White House and previous administrations received

warped intelligence from Iran, not because CIA agents were handcuffed by constitutional prohibitions, but because they did not venture outside embassy circles. American officials also respected Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's insistence that they not seek out his opponents.

If CIA operatives had visited the villages and sought contact with the Iranian masses, they would have discovered deep dissatisfaction with the shah.

Allowing the CIA to hide behind the veil of national security will not improve the quality of American intelligence nearly so much as simple reporting and a knowledge of the language, culture and history of other countries. Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan should send CIA agents back to their books, not back to their old tricks.

The CIA needs the discipline of a charter precisely because the intelligence force has not recognized its own limits. Leaving CIA spies to their own devices will hasten a return to the miscalculations of the 1960s and 1970s.

Mr. Carter and Congress should not abdicate their responsibility to mold the CIA into a useful intelligence-gathering agency. The charter should be left with strict presidential and congressional reins on the CIA, including current reporting requirements.

BENNINGTON BANNER (VT)
18 January 1980

Editorial

Dicey business

The CIA is an issue again. In the mid-1970s there was a political tempest about its excesses; now the cry is about its inadequacies. The world, suddenly, seems like a much more confusing and dangerous place to many Americans — not least, to the president — and they are less concerned with excesses than with performance.

At present the CIA must notify eight congressional committees before it undertakes any covert action. Secrets tend to pass through congressional committees like water tumbling through a downspout; there is little opportunity now for covert action because the "secrets" would soon leap into headlines. Defenders of the CIA argue that only two committees should be notified, and we agree. To explain:

The CIA's record on its covert actions has not been very good. For those who would like details, we again recommend Thomas Powers' book, "The Man Who Kept the Secrets. Richard Helms and the CIA," which presents a lucid and apparently rather complete history of the agency. If one narrowly defines the CIA's mission as the protection and pursuit of U.S. interests abroad, its record is mottled.

There seems to be a widely held misconception that the CIA, on its own initiative, planned such fiascos as the Bay of Pigs invasion or the overthrow of Allende's government in Chile. Hardly so. The agency was acting with implicit instructions from the U.S. president, just as it apparently was when it collaborated with the Mafia in an attempt to kill Castro.

The CIA has been at the beck and call of every president since

Roosevelt, and if the agency has blots on its escutcheon, the reasons are at least as much of conception as execution. If, as in the case of Chile, the operations now seem unconscionable, that is more the fault of the president who ordered them than of the agency which carried them out.

The CIA essentially has three roles: It must gather and analyze information, which it does now largely by satellite and electronic eavesdropping. It must maintain effective counterintelligence operations to assure that it is not penetrated by enemy agents; the CIA is useless if its reports cannot be trusted without question. And finally it should, if called upon, be able to mount operations abroad.

It is only the latter capability which now is in question. Unless this country is willing to entirely forsake covert action, it must change the present system of reporting to Congress. Congress is an unreliable instrument for supervising individual operations.

Congress, however, has the responsibility to set the ground rules for covert action. It must establish what is permissible and what is not — assassinations, for instance, should be banned. It must establish how CIA officers should respond to general congressional committee probes. It must, in short, establish boundaries, and then let the executive branch supervise operations.

The president, meanwhile, needs to study history. Covert action is dicey business, best suited to precise objectives. It needs to be in the national arsenal, but it should be used only with much thought and discretion. As Powers' book makes plain, this has not been the case in the past.

SAN DIEGO UNION
19 January 1980

Unshackle The CIA

The swift Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, coming on the heels of the Iranian revolution, has shocked the Carter administration into awareness that it can no longer afford the luxury of conducting intelligence operations in the open air.

These and other events of the last 12 months demonstrate the folly of hamstringing the Central Intelligence Agency with the requirement that its proposed covert operations be reported to no fewer than eight congressional committees. This stifling requirement was laid upon the CIA by what is known as the Hughes-Ryan amendment to a 1974 foreign aid bill. It was intended to provide broad congressional oversight of the nation's intelligence community and avoid in the future such excesses of the past as the CIA plots to assassinate two chiefs of foreign governments.

While few will doubt the need to check such rash adventurism,

the curb imposed by Hughes-Ryan was so drastic that it virtually paralyzed the CIA. Required to report to a multitude of committees, each with a large staff, publicity-seeking members and sieve-like security, the CIA quickly found that any secret project it mentioned was almost instantly compromised by public exposure.

We are rediscovering how vital intelligence operations are to the nation's security and we realize better now that covert activities by the CIA are essential, notwithstanding the "dirty tricks" of the past. Many covert undertakings are appropriate to the new circumstances this nation faces in the Middle East where it is oftentimes impossible or impolitic to assist friendly groups openly.

The Hughes-Ryan amendment should be repealed by Congress as soon as possible so the CIA can restore the vital services which it long conducted with

some distinguished successes.

A secondary goal of the administration should be to plug the leaks in the Freedom of Information Act that permit foreign — and sometimes unfriendly — governments to demand and receive information through official channels about CIA operations involving them. The Freedom of Information Act provides an important check on secret actions by federal agencies against Americans and care needs to be taken to preserve this protection while eliminating the comfort it now gives foreign regimes.

An additional reform the Carter administration is reportedly preparing is a new charter that, if properly drawn, can define the proper role of the Central Intelligence Agency, establish secure and reasonable congressional oversight, and allay the inevitable concerns of Americans about the conduct of a powerful secret agency with large public funds at its disposal.

ORLANDO SENTINEL-STAR (FL.)
20 January 1980

CIA comeback

WITH not a moment to spare, the White House is pushing to unleash and revitalize the Central Intelligence Agency.

In one of the most devastating reactions to the Watergate scandal, Congress displayed its usual study in hysteria and overreaction by reaching way down into the CIA's vitals and ripping out its heart and lungs.

The result has been a series of intelligence breakdowns and an exodus of skilled employees reminiscent of the evacuation of the Titanic. We may never know the full extent of the intelligence breakdown, but events in Iran and Afghanistan give a clue to the need to restore our intelligence capability.

But you have to give those congressmen credit. They weren't foolish enough to just abolish the agency or cut its funding. Instead, they told the CIA to continue your activities but don't do anything covert unless it's specifically approved by the president. And, oh yes, one more thing, report all of your covert activities to no less than eight congressional committees."

Six years after its legs were sliced off at the hips, someone has finally realized why the CIA hasn't been running all that well.

Now begins the effort to get the CIA ambulatory again. Let us hope the restorative effort isn't too late.

SAVANNAH PRESS (GA.)

21 January 1980

Editorial

Refurbish the CIA

Along with all the other problems that have descended on the White House in recent months there must be the realization that U.S. intelligence operations are in sad shape.

Many people warned this would happen when Congress and the Administration yielded to critics of the Central Intelligence Agency and practically dismantled it.

We do not accept excuses for the CIA's excesses or for politicians' efforts to use the agency for their own purposes. Obviously, however, the right solution to these problems was not the course that was taken.

A string of intelligence failures has occurred in the wake of the attack on the CIA which caused the agency to become demoralized and ineffective. They range all the way from Africa to Afghanistan.

The Heritage Foundation said in a recent study that "U.S. intelligence capabilities have been degraded to such an extent" that they no longer provide adequate information and support for national policy.

This erosion created its greatest damage during the early 1970s and was continued when the Carter Administration placed sharp limitations on intelligence operations.

For example, President Carter's suspension of reconnaissance flights

over Cuba in 1977 led to "a failure to monitor the Soviet buildup in Cuba."

Soviet intrusion into African states was not anticipated by U.S. intelligence. It was only last December that the Administration's intelligence began to warn the Soviets were up to something in Afghanistan, but Heritage Foundation says "the Soviets took virtual command of Afghan military operations" over a period of two years. Intelligence in the Middle East has been poor since the early 1970s and the U.S. can't even decide if an illegal nuclear blast occurred over the Indian Ocean last September. In Iran, intelligence has been terrible. Not only was the threat to the Shah underestimated but Ayatollah Khomeini was completely misread by President Carter's intelligence sources.

If the hostage situation were not deadly serious because of the threat to Americans' lives, the terrorists' complaints about spying activity would be laughable. U.S. intelligence didn't anticipate the embassy seizure and Washington had to rely on European intelligence for most of its information about the prisoners and their captors.

President Carter should give high priority to refurbishing U.S. intelligence operations. This task cannot be accomplished overnight, but any immediate improvements would be welcome and might even help to avert a shooting war.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
26 January 1980

Unshackling the CIA

In his State of the Union address President Carter called on Congress to pass "a new charter to define clearly the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies" and to remove "unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence and to tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information."

Seven senators in a bipartisan group the very next day introduced legislation to accomplish the second aim, but Congress continues to drag its feet on the first—drawing up a charter under which the agencies would operate—and that won't do.

We concur in the need to repeal the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974, which among other things requires the CIA to report its covert operations to no fewer than eight congressional committees. That means sharing secrets with more than 200 senators and representatives and often their staffs.

This requirement has, we are told, shackled the CIA to the point of impotence. Congress

would be justified in reducing the secret-sharing to the intelligence committees of both houses, which would make only 29 legislators privy to deep secrets.

We also have no quarrel with proposals to ease the CIA's obligation under the Freedom of Information Act to open its files on demand to anyone, even, as has happened, to the embassy of Poland. It would be protection enough, as the new legislation proposes, to open files to Americans seeking to confirm that their own rights haven't been violated.

But these steps must be taken only in tandem with approval of clear rules and regulations to prevent the wholesale abuses of the constitutional rights of Americans and the sovereignty of other nations so shamefully revealed in the early 1970s. Work on such a charter is "nearly complete."

The shackles on the intelligence services should be loosened, but only with guarantees that the abuses that required them to be forged will not be resumed.

NEW YORK NEWS WORLD
21 January 1980

CIA secrecy vital if democracy itself is to survive

We're still at war and need
to take covert steps to win



JOHN D.
LOFTON,
JR.

WASHINGTON—Morris Halperin, considered by one astute observer to be perhaps "the most important" Capitol Hill lobbyist regarding intelligence matters, is against all CIA covert activities because, he says, they are anti-democratic in that their secrecy denies the American people the right to know what their government is doing. In point of fact, as the law is now written, proposed CIA covert actions are made known to numerous important Americans, including the president and 163 members of Congress and their staffs, representing eight congressional committees. But, putting this aside, Halperin's statement deserves a response.

Secrecy per se is not undemocratic at all. For centuries, unauthorized visitors were not allowed in the British House of Commons. In our own country, all of the early Revolutionary colonial assemblies were secret, as were the proceedings of the First Continental Congress.

In 1787, the Constitutional Convention was conducted entirely in secret. On May 28-29, at the prompting of Pierce Butler of South Carolina to guard "against licentious publications of their proceedings," the convention voted that no copy of the journal could be made without permission; that delegates only could inspect the journal; and that nothing spoken within the convention could be published, printed or communicated unless authorized.

Secrecy aided convention

At the time, a delegate from Virginia, George Mason, called the secrecy rule a "necessary precaution

to prevent misrepresentations or mistakes." In later years, James Madison insisted that "no constitution would ever have been adopted by the convention if the debates had been public." Historian Clinton Rossiter observes: "It is hard to disagree with these opinions." Writing in his book, "1787: The Great Convention," he says:

"The remarkable thing about the secrecy rule is not that it was so readily adopted, but that it was so rigidly observed by the delegates and so uncomplainingly accepted by the press and public.... It is a fact of huge consequence that the spirit and customs of the age encouraged the men of 1787 to produce 'an open covenant, secretly arrived at.' Indeed, it may be argued plausibly that only by being somewhat less than fully democratic in two crucial aspects—the process of selection that left the anti-nationalists at home, and the decision for secrecy that left them quite in the dark—was the convention able to write a charter on which a stable democracy could arise and flourish."

So careful was George Washington concerning the convention's procedure that he decided to record nothing in his diary. So careful was Madison in writing to a cousin, the president of William and Mary College, that the exasperated cousin wrote Madison: "If you cannot tell us what you are doing, you might at least give us some information of what you are not doing."

Actions against hostility

CIA covert actions abroad are designed to alter the political, economic or military realities in other countries. Covert actions include such things as financially supporting a clandestine radio station, a publication, or an opposition political party and yes, occasionally even the use of deadly force against an enemy. As Dr. Ernest Lefever, founding director of the Ethics and Public Policy

Center here, notes in his new book, "The CIA and the American Ethic," covert actions are undertaken to prevent developments deemed hostile to the interests of one's nation and to create situations in which those interests are furthered.

The most extensive covert actions waged by U.S. intelligence occurred during the 1940s, when a sequence of operations successfully prevented Soviet-controlled communist parties from dominating Western Europe.

"OK," you may be saying, "however, this was in the middle of and just after a war." But we are still at war with the Soviets—a spy war for the world in such areas as the Mideast, Africa, Western Europe, and a host of other hot-spots around the globe. We are also at war with international terrorists.

It is in our national interest to know what's going on in these places and, just as important, to be able to affect what happens in a way that is favorable to our country. The CIA's capability to conduct covert operations in secret, with a minimum of congressional oversight, is vital to this crucial effort. If this capability is not preserved and used, we run the risk that we will have no more democracy.

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

CHARTERS - SUBJECT STIRRING (WATCH OUT FOR
NEXT WEEK)

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

TROY TIMES RECORD (N. Y.)
19 January 1980

Stratton opposes creating a CIA charter

By MICHAEL CONNOR
Record Albany Bureau

TROY — Rep. Samuel S. Stratton, D-Amsterdam, Friday said he opposes a movement in Washington to write a charter for the Central Intelligence Agency.

"It's better to leave them alone," Stratton said during a meeting with the editorial board of The Times Record and The Sunday Record. "You don't want to write too many restrictions into a charter. It's unrealistic stuff."

Stratton, a ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, appears to be among a growing number of congressmen and senators looking favorably towards the intelligence-gathering outfit. Apparently the hostage-taking in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union has created wide-spread doubts about America's ability to collect reliable information on foreign military and political developments.

According to The Christian Science Monitor, that sentiment in Congress may help incorporate pro-CIA provisions into a charter being drafted. Those pro-CIA features include reduc-

ing from eight to two the number of watchdog congressional committees; outlawing the identifying of undercover agents; and curbing public access to many classified documents through the federal Freedom of Information Act.

"I'm leery of writing restrictions into it," Stratton said. "Those guys will be coming with poison pills and our people with have roses in their pockets and Bibles."

During the interview, Stratton predicted "there will be great agreement on increasing defense spending" when Congress returns to Washington next week. He said an increase proposed last year by the Carter Administration to win support for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was meaningless with inflation at near 14 percent annually.

Stratton, a self-described hawk, said a 10 percent increase above the inflation rate was required each year for the foreseeable future. He said the Navy needs more ships. More money must be spent for developing new weapons and the number of conventional weapons such as tanks must be increased, he said.

"I think Congress has been behind the people," he said. "I think people are strong for defense now."

On local matters, Stratton said a \$153 million set of improvements at the Watervliet Arsenal should begin on schedule. "I think they're in good shape," he said.

He also said he would support a bill by Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham, D-The Bronx, likely to aid proponents of plans for a local urban cultural park.

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ON PAGE A12

THE BALTIMORE SUN
4 February 1980

A Charter for the CIA

President Carter's call to Congress to remove some restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency is sure to get a friendly reception on the Hill. We hope it won't be too friendly.

Congress could loosen some restraints and make the CIA and other intelligence-gathering organizations more effective. An obvious improvement would be to modify the six-year-old law which in effect requires the president to report covert activity to eight congressional committees. Reducing that to the Senate and House Intelligence committees would greatly reduce the risk of leaks injurious to the national security, while at the same time fulfilling the need for effective congressional oversight of cloak and dagger derring-do. Another improvement would be legislation penalizing intelligence agency employees who reveal damaging national security secrets.

Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D, N.Y.) has introduced a bill to accomplish both those goals, but we strongly urge the Senate not to follow him on this. His bill goes too far in defense of secrecy on these matters (and on the related matter of exempting the CIA from some freedom of information requirements). And it doesn't go far enough in the matters of imposing statutory restraints on CIA activities and making the president and attorney general the officers responsible for CIA activities likely to affect foreign policy or the constitutional rights of American citizens.

Senator Walter Huddleston and other members of

the Senate Intelligence Committee, including Senator Charles Mathias (R, Md.), have been working on a bill that does take a more acceptable approach to the intelligence agencies. They met with President Carter yesterday and seem to be close to agreement on a bill.

This bill would establish a charter for the CIA, limiting its range of activities and spelling out what procedures must be followed before allowed activities could be undertaken. It would also go beyond the Moynihan bill in requiring the president to report to the Intelligence committees in advance of certain covert operations, rather than "as soon as possible." As to leaks of material, Senator Moynihan would make journalists as well as intelligence agency employees subject to fines and imprisonment for honest and innocent reporting of some secret information not really damaging to national security. That's wholly improper. The charter bill would limit the offenders to intelligence agency employees, but even it goes too far in what information may not be revealed. This could be the first step toward an official secrets act, repugnant to the First Amendment, and must be closely studied by Congress.

In the climate created by Iran and Afghanistan, there is a natural inclination by lawmakers to want to come to the aid of intelligence agencies. But there should be no heedless rush. The Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee painted painful pictures of what happens when agencies such as the CIA are too loosely reined.

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

IRAN - THE THINEST IT'S BEEN

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

DAYTON JOURNAL HERALD (OHIO)
22 January 1980

CIA action in Iran backed

A former deputy director of the CIA yesterday told a Dayton audience he would have used "that bad ole covert action" to free the U.S. Embassy personnel being held hostage in Iran.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, now co-chairman of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, a Washington-based group opposing the strategic arms limitation treaty, said he would have resorted to the CIA if a threat of war failed to stop the Iranian revolutionary government from supporting the Iranians holding the hostages.

Graham, also a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's intelligence arm, made his remarks to members of the Dayton Council on World Affairs and the Rotary Club of Dayton, who met jointly at Stouffer's Dayton Plaza.

The former intelligence officer said his use of the CIA would have involved "a formation of soldiers" often filmed by television crews marching in front of the American Embassy in Teheran as their countrymen

chanted "Death to Carter!"

"One fine day, that bunch of soldiers would have been my guys, lock stock and barrels," he said. And those soldiers would have suddenly wheeled and stormed the embassy, just as helicopter support came whirling over the horizon, he added.

"I would have probably gotten some of our hostages killed," the retired general said. "But that's the way I would have done."

Graham said his war threat would have been made immediately after the Iranians siezed the embassy and took its inhabitants hostage. "I would," he said, "have got the word — not openly but quietly — to the powers that be, that if they backed the terrorist grab at our embassy, they would have committed an act of war on the United States and the United States would have to seriously consider declaring war on Iran."

"I think that would have prevented their government from joining the terrorists."

Graham argued that both the Iranian hos-

tage and Afghanistan invasions situations are the result of U.S. foreign policy over the last past dozen years — a policy he considers exemplified by the proposed SALT II treaty.

But "things could be turned around by a frank admission that we have pursued a bad policy for 12 years," he said. "What we've got to do is recognize what we're up against. We're up against an aggressive, expansive Soviet adversary ... we've got to get back to understanding that the containment policy, which WAS a good policy, is not a bad policy."

Graham insisted, however, he is not advocating a resumption an all-out arms race with the Soviet Union.

"More important than throwing money at the Pentagon is to get our act straight."

And the best way of accomplishing that, he said, would be to do nothing to resurrect the SALT II treaty now that President Carter has said he won't ask for ratification as long as Soviet troops are in Afghanistan.

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ON PAGE A1-26

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 February 1980

Arrest of Minister Assailed

Bani-Sadr Castigates Radicals

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Staff Writer

Iran's new president yesterday issued his harshest attack yet against the radical Moslems occupying the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, labeling them "self-centered children" after they engineered the arrest of a government minister accused of being a CIA ally.

In an interview with the Tehran daily newspaper Kayhan, President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr denounced the embassy captors for behaving like "a government within a government" and said their practice of making unproven allegations against Iranian officials creates chaos.

Last night, the ruling Revolutionary Council, which appointed Bani-Sadr acting chairman Tuesday, backed his bitter protest against the militants by calling for the release of Information Minister Nasser Minachi, who was arrested early yesterday, according to reports from Tehran.

Since his election last month as Iran's first president, Bani-Sadr, who has called for a rapid solution of the embassy crisis, has been moving toward a showdown with the Islamic militants who have been holding an estimated 50 Americans hostage for 95 days.

U.S. officials, who see Bani-Sadr as the best hope for negotiating an end to the 13-week-old crisis, say the new president must first consolidate his own power and isolate the embassy militants who demand the return of Iran's deposed shah as the price of releasing the hostages.

Minachi, the first Cabinet minister to be denounced in a series of "revelations" by the militants, was arrested at his home at 2 a.m. yesterday after a spokesman for the captors said over national television that embassy documents show he was a collaborator of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

One document cited was dated Dec. 8, 1978, a month before shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi fled Iran, according to news reports from Tehran. The document allegedly said of Minachi: "He has been very truthful and frank with the embassy staff and has been passing information."

The minister was taken to Evin Prison where officials were reported questioning him about his alleged CIA contacts. He was arrested on a warrant signed by an Islamic revolu-

tionary court that apparently was prompted by the broadcast, observers said.

In an interview with Reuter after the broadcast, Minachi described the allegations as nonsense. He said the contents of the documents were "just the personal concept of the political officers of the embassy" whom he met before the shah was overthrown.

Bani-Sadr, who has consistently criticized the embassy takeover and is believed to have been responsible for Tuesday's departure from government service of the religious leader closest to the militants, stepped up his attack in the Kayhan interview yesterday.

"Why do they always put these children on the air without consulting the authorities?" he asked, combining his denunciation of the militants with another blast against the state broadcasting complex he claims has unfairly criticized him and other moderates.

Of the most recent broadcast, he said, "It is a self-centered action by the students. How can one rule a country when a group called 'students following the path of the imam' acts in a self-centered way and behaves like a government within a government?"

"It is the courts that must investigate those allegations," Bani-Sadr continued, "and then judge whether a person is guilty or not. Otherwise, chaos will be created in the country."

In a separate move possibly related to Bani-Sadr's growing power struggle with embassy militants, 50 Americans who were invited to Iran by the captors were delayed at Tehran's airport for four hours before being allowed into the nation's capital.

The militants are believed to have invited the American group, whose members are sympathetic to last February's revolution, to use them as a publicity vehicle showing that some U.S. residents are more interested in their grievances than the hostages.

Observers in Tehran say the radical youths may hope to discredit a "pack-

age deal" worked out by the United Nations that is being considered by Iranian authorities. It calls for holding an international inquiry into the shah's reign while the hostages are put in the hands of a third party.

A statement from the militants said the visitors agreed to avoid discussion of the hostages and to focus on Iran's revolution, according to news reports. The militants claim the hostages' troubles are small compared to Iran's past sufferings.

Before leaving for Iran, Norman Forer, the American group's leader, said in New York that there were no firm conditions for the visit. Forer, a University of Kansas faculty member who traveled to Iran in December, said the visit would last 10 days and he expected to "continue the dialogue. I hope I can come back to say there were substantial changes."

The group consists of priests, lawyers, labor leaders, professors, blacks and Indians, according to news reports.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8NEW YORK TIMES
4 FEBRUARY 1980

Captors' Tape of a Hostage's Call To Mother Cites Good Treatment

TEHERAN, Iran, Feb. 3 (Reuters) — The militants occupying the United States Embassy here released a tape-recording today in which one of two female hostages at the embassy assured her family in a telephone conversation that she and the other Americans were being treated well.

Elizabeth Ann Swift, the 38-year-old chief of the embassy's political section, told her mother in the United States: "Listen, Ma, I don't know what you're all hearing, but they are treating us very, very well."

A tape-recording of the conversation between Miss Swift and her mother, which apparently took place in the last few days, was made available today to Reuters by the Iranians occupying the embassy.

[Miss Swift's mother, Helen, lives in the District of Columbia, but could not be reached for comment.]

The militants have charged that letters from hostages published in the United States complaining about their conditions were forgeries. In the recording, Miss Swift said: "I take it that the whole United States is just up in arms and anything that anybody can do, you know, to just calm them down. And tell them that the Shah is just such an awful person."

Criticism of the C.I.A.

"The other part of it," she went on, "is that in taking the embassy, what the kids were really worried about was the United States once more was going to try to overthrow the Government here."

"You know, I don't know what the C.I.A. was doing here, but it was doing things that it shouldn't have been doing, and I just wish the United States would realize that too."

Miss Swift was one of two women kept at the embassy when others were freed in November on the orders of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolutionary leader. This was apparently because, as a political officer, she was involved in reporting back to Washington on the situation in Iran.

She said of the militants: "The guys had a certain point when they came here. But, anyway, don't worry about that. I just wanted to make sure you understood how I felt, because I will not defend this sort of nonsense."

Mother Urged to Report Call

Miss Swift tried to persuade her mother to report the telephone call to the State Department.

Her mother replied: "I don't know what I ought to do about the State Department. I don't think I'd better tell them."

"No," Miss Swift replied, "you go ahead and tell them, Ma."

"No, I won't, darling" the mother said. "For your sake."

"It doesn't matter," Miss Swift said. "Whatever you want. But Ma, don't worry about my sake. The students say 'fine' and Mother, do go ahead and tell them. I do not want to have you hiding things from the State Department. You tell them. Other people are probably doing it too."

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

AFGHANISTAN

ALSO SLOW

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

ARTICLE APPROVED
ON PAGE A-8NEW YORK TIMES
7 FEBRUARY 1980

Afghan Insurgency: High Soviet Casualties Doubted

By DREW MIDDLETON

The level of Afghan rebel activity against Soviet forces and Afghan Government troops has risen perceptibly in the last five days. During that period Soviet reinforcement of the Kandahar area and around Shindand has accelerated.

Military Analysis Nothing in the military situation suggests that the Soviet forces are getting bogged down in a long guerrilla war, in the view of military analysts. They believe that reports by Tass, the Soviet press agency, of actions against guerrillas in the provinces of Nangarhar, Badakhshan and Paktia reflect frustration about failure thus far to eliminate the insurgency rather than any basic concern about the outcome of the fighting.

The assertion by unidentified Washington sources that the Soviet forces had suffered anywhere from 2,000 to 10,000 casualties is questioned by military sources.

These sources say that, if the higher figure is accepted, the casualties would be about equal to those suffered by the Allies in the first 24 hours of the Normandy landings in June 1944. These were the largest landing operations in history.

West Europeans Equally Dubious

Western European military analysts are equally dubious about the figures. They say that, even if the minimum figures of 2,000 and an estimated 500 casualties a week are accepted, these are disproportionate to the Soviet effort.

Most of the fighting appears to be concentrated in three provinces, all close to military supplies. Badakhshan is in the mountainous northeast adjoining the Soviet Union, and its eastern panhandle has a 50-mile-long frontier with China. Tass contends that thousands of rebels trained in China and accompanied by Chinese advisers are infiltrating across the 10,000-foot-high mountains to blow up

bridges, block roads and harass Afghan Army outposts.

Nangarhar and Paktia, the two other provinces, are contiguous to Pakistan and are accessible from Peshawar and Kohat by passes through the mountains. Intelligence reports say these passes are patrolled by Soviet and Afghan forces.

Military sources say any movement of men and weapons into Afghanistan would be against the policy of Pakistan, which is said to fear Soviet reprisals. Some Pakistani officers have told Western officials that they believe the Tass charges of infiltration may serve as an excuse for a Soviet expedition across the frontier.

Rebels Said to Control Badakhshan

The extent of Afghan rebel resistance remains difficult to ascertain. Western sources say the rebels control most of Badakhshan Province and are using mortars and heavy machine guns to harass the Soviet forces.

The pattern of rebel activity appears to be similar in all three provinces, with forays against Soviet and Afghan outposts, destruction of bridges and long-range sniping. Occasionally a sentry is rushed and knifed, in the Afghan style.

Fewer doubts are felt about the Soviet reinforcement. A report from Kandahar said a Soviet column with 35 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 25 guns and support vehicles and tanker trucks had arrived over the weekend. The column, according to these reports, came directly from the Soviet Union.

Another column including 5 tanks, 46 armored personnel carriers and 250 trucks entered Afghanistan at the same time at Heiratan, the crossing point on the Amu Darya, a river that forms the Soviet-Afghan frontier.

The strategic significance of these reinforcements is a subject for speculation. Some do not believe that the Russians need more than the estimated 110,000

troops now in Afghanistan to deal with the rebellion. These sources view the reinforcements as the basis for future operations against Iran or Pakistan.

A second view is that the Russians are following their basic military doctrine of establishing overwhelming strength to meet any local contingencies. According to this view, the Russians not only continue to build up their ground forces but have concentrated large numbers of strike planes, especially Su-17 fighter bombers, at Shindand and other airports.

One of the Soviet preoccupations is protection of the supply routes into Afghanistan. The bridges along the highway to Kabul, from Mazar-i-Sharif to the Salang tunnel, are guarded by tanks and armored personnel carriers. Tanks carrying bridging equipment are placed along the highway, and snowplows clear the roads after every heavy fall.

Rebel activity, analysts believe, is limited by shortages of ammunition. Zafaruddin Khan, a rebel chief in northwest Afghanistan, told visitors that, after his men spend their daily ration of 25 rounds of rifle ammunition, they throw stones at Soviet and Afghan forces.

Significant Chinese Role Doubted

Western sources doubt Soviet reports of Chinese intervention. The thousands of rebels noted by Tass may be available, but in view of the Chinese Army's own needs, the furnishing of large amounts of weapons to the Afghan rebels is doubted.

The contention that the Chinese are instructing the Afghans in guerrilla tactics is also doubted. One source said the Afghans had been fighting guerrilla wars since the dawn of history and required no instruction.

The overall impression among Western analysts is that the Soviet forces are establishing a military presence in Afghanistan that far outweighs their immediate or future military requirements.

Tanks, armored personnel carriers and trucks ring the main cities and towns. A microwave communications center has been set up at Pul-i-Khumri, north of the Salang tunnel, and another is believed to be under construction in the Kandahar area.

To military analysts in the United States and Western Europe the overriding question is not the extent of the Soviet ground and air forces now deployed, but what Moscow intends to do with them.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6WALL STREET JOURNAL
4 FEBRUARY 1980

Soviets May Have to Use Heavy Bombers To Hold Afghanistan, U.S. Officials Say

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON — Because Soviet troops are failing "dismally" to crush Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan, the Russians may soon begin using heavy bombers to attack rebel strongholds, U.S. officials predicted.

The officials, basing their assessment on the latest U.S. intelligence reports from Afghanistan, told a group of reporters that current evidence suggests that Soviet forces in Afghanistan are becoming bogged down in an unwinnable, Vietnam-like quagmire.

The officials said that numerous intelligence reports indicate Soviet reversals during the five-week-old invasion of Afghanistan. Far from blitzing the rebels, said one U.S. official, the Soviet ground troops "have had a dismal performance against a lightly armed, ragtag band of bandits."

The analysts predicted that because of the difficulties of using ground forces in the rugged Afghanistan terrain, the Soviets may decide to escalate the war this spring by sending TU16 bombers from bases in southern Russia to attack insurgent strongholds.

Pathetic Picture Offered

Further, in sketching their assessment of the Soviets' situation, the analysts painted an almost pathetic picture of the 50,000 Russian troops in Afghanistan. The soldiers face a sullen Afghan population and a mutinous Afghan army; they are forced to steal food from local stores because of inadequate supplies, and they are plagued by hit-and-run insurgent forces that "block roads, raid camps and slit throats," the U.S. officials said.

One official added that it appeared unlikely that the Soviet military could eradicate the insurgents even if it deployed 200,000 troops—more than double the current invasion force. He said that the Russians appear to be suffering about 500 casualties a week in Afghanistan, and that coffins and

form letters to the families of dead soldiers are beginning to arrive in Soviet towns.

But the catalog of Soviet woes cited in the U.S. intelligence reports probably should be discounted, because much of the information appears to come from the insurgent camp. The U.S. analysts conceded that some of the rebel reports—claiming that 10,000 Soviet troops were killed in one week and asserting that the Soviets are using chemical weapons—aren't believable.

Senior U.S. policymakers also caution that the Vietnam analogy may be misplaced. They note that however costly the war in Afghanistan may be for the Soviets, they aren't likely to face the sort of massive internal dissent that the U.S. did a decade ago. What's more, the Soviets may be less restrained in their use of military power in Afghanistan than was the U.S. in Vietnam.

Saturation Bombing Possible

The Soviets, argued one analyst familiar with intelligence reports, "will try to eliminate the insurgents through the cheapest means available." This official said that the Soviets already have moved as many as 36 TU16 bombers to bases near the Afghanistan border. He argued that the Soviets might begin saturation-bombing raids with these planes when the winter weather clears in several months. "They haven't brought them there to sit on the runways," the official said.

The U.S. assessment that the Soviets are faring worse than they expected in Afghanistan is based partly on what one analyst termed the "collapse" of the Afghan army. He said that desertions have cut the Afghan army to about 30,000, compared with an estimated 100,000 troops in April 1978, when a coup first installed a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan.

The analysts said there were reports that an entire regiment of Afghanistan's army—about 1,000 men—joined the rebel forces last

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 42

THE BALTIMORE SUN
4 February 1980

Patrols in Kabul stepped up

Soviet army feeling growing Afghan revolt

By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Soviet army in Afghanistan is running into increasing resistance, according to Carter administration officials.

The nationalist struggle now is so widespread, according to officials, that it has affected the distribution of consumer goods, particularly food.

Some Soviet soldiers reportedly have taken to stealing from shops, increasing Afghan resentment of the occupation.

Nationalist guerrillas, according to the officials, have become more daring, launching increasing numbers of daylight attacks against the Soviets.

The Soviets are reported to be increasing their security forces in Kabul, the capital, reacting to what is seen as the growing popular unrest.

The major Soviet anti-nationalist drive is under way in the northeast area of the country, near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, but there now is speculation that smaller operations will have to be mounted in other provinces too.

Because of the mountainous terrain, the Soviets are expected to rely mainly on air strikes against nationalist positions. Airfields in eastern Afghanistan are being

reinforced, apparently in preparation for such punitive action.

State Department officials believe the Soviets may have underestimated the reaction to their invasion, but there is a general feeling that the Red Army has the muscle to establish control of the principal municipalities even if it cannot hope to eradicate the resistance.

Another problem for the Kremlin that surfaced last week is the reported "unreliability" of Red Army troops from the Central Asian, traditionally Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. U.S. intelligence reports say these troops have been showing sympathy for the Afghans and now are being replaced by fresh, "uncontaminated" units from western areas of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Reacting to the Soviet invasion and the implicit threat to the Indian subcontinent, the administration currently is drafting legislation to increase military and economic aid to Pakistan.

A package to reinforce Pakistan for the next two years is being prepared, and further aid levels will depend on the developing situation.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1980

Soviets Meeting 'Vietnam' Trouble In Afghan Attack

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union's top military officer, Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, arrived yesterday in the capital of Afghanistan where he found military problems that begin to resemble those American forces faced a decade ago in Indochina.

There is no question that Soviet troops control the major Afghan cities, the main roads and the government in Kabul. The chance that the scattered bands of insurgents could somehow defeat the Russians is zero.

Nevertheless, according to the best estimates of U.S. specialists in global intelligence, the Soviet military is confronted with serious difficulties. These include the harassment by Afghan rebels who move about the countryside with random effectiveness, the defection of Afghan Army units whose soldiers take their weapons over to the rebel side and the disappointing performance of some Soviet divisions.

Americans who remember the frustrations of the U.S. war in Vietnam may see some similarities in these developments reported by U.S. officials in Washington:

- Intelligence officials say they have credible reports from rebel leaders that the Soviets have used napalm in some actions near Jalalabad.

- The Soviets are operating squadrons of SU17, Mig21 and Yak28 fighter-bombers from bases in Afghanistan and nearby in the Soviet Union, using ground controllers to call in the air strikes as the United States did. The Soviets also have brought in 24 to 36 bigger TU16 bombers close to the border, but have used them thus far only for reconnaissance.

- Aside from the roughly 80,000-plus army troops in six divisions now in the country, there are said to be tens of thousands of individual military personnel—officers, enlisted specialists and foot soldiers rather than entire units—that are now moving toward Afghanistan from all over the Soviet Union as replacements for the largely local reserve soldiers used initially for a 90-day stint.

The overall estimate is that 150,000 to 200,000 Soviet military men are, in one way or another, being affected by the Afghan invasion. While officials call this shift slight and say it is not making a serious dent in major Soviet forces in Europe or on the Chinese border, it reflects a growing call on military manpower.

- Soviet casualties from all causes—including sniper fire and highway accidents during the first month of the invasion are about 2,000 killed and wounded, an estimate which U. S. officials seem relatively confident about. Casualties continue to run about 500 a week, they report, and form letters sent home report the deaths but not where they took place.

- The Soviet strategy now appears to be to stay in the key urban areas and provincial capitals, keep open the two main roads to the Soviet Union, protect the airfields and conduct limited counterinsurgency strikes from

their main camps against pockets of rebel resistance.

- U. S. specialists believe there are not enough Soviet troops in Afghanistan now to carry out countrywide sweeps and defeat the insurgent forces totally. Those forces are estimated at 50,000 to more than 10,000 divided among 10 or 20 uncoordinated groups, many of them tribal, and some of them occasionally fight each other.

There is also some doubt that the Soviets ever will try the all-out sweeps since they are certain to raise their own casualties by pitting Soviet armored units not well suited to battle Afghan guerrillas in the harsh mountainous terrain.

Like Vietnam, there are also some surprises.

Soviet Mi-24 helicopter gunships, heavily armored and unable to get up very high because of the weather, are being shot down on occasion from above by rebels with machine guns in the mountains.

The two airborne divisions in Afghanistan are among the best in the Soviet army. But the four motorized rifle divisions, in the assessment here, have turned in "a dismal performance against lightly armed ragtag bands of bandits."

U. S. government officials say there is reliable information indicating the leadership in the Soviet defense ministry is very disappointed at their performance thus far.

The example cited is the three-week struggle of units of those forces to reach and take two provincial capitals—Feyzabad and Taloqan—in the extreme northeast of the country, a sensitive, mountainous area near the Soviet border.

Insurgents, now scattered through the countryside, used landslides, sniper fire and bridge demolition to thwart the Soviet advance.

Nevertheless, though the going may be slower than expected, specialists say there is no political or military evidence to suggest that the Soviets will back away and that there is every indication that they are in Afghanistan for the long run.

This spring could be a turning point. Warmer weather will allow Soviet land and air power to be used more widely if Moscow gives the signal. U.S. specialists say there is no evidence to confirm reports of poison gas use, though the Soviets have gas warfare equipment with them and could use it in the spring in weather that makes it more effective.

For the moment, the Soviet divisions have their hands full and specialists see no evidence of any pend-

CONTINUED

ing moves into neighboring Iran or Pakistan. But greater use of military force this spring is the kind of thing U.S. officials believe could spill over the borders if the Soviets pursue, by ground or air, rebels moving among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iran's president elect, Abol Hassan Beni-Sadr, said last week that Iran would aid the Afghan people with all means possible, including military means.

The U.S. officials say the Afghan insurgents are now "not hurting for weapons" and are getting them from Afghan army deserters. They claim the Afghan government army, which was in disarray and had 70,000 or 80,000 men before the Soviet invasion, is now down to roughly 30,000 men and that there is evidence the Soviets — not trusting the army's loyalty — are disarming units in many areas of the

country. The Afghan air force also reportedly has been grounded.

Rebuilding a demoralized force into a loyal army to eventually relieve the Soviet military presence, U.S. specialists estimate, will take one to three years if it can be done at all.

U.S. sources claim that last week an entire, 1,000-man regimental unit in western Afghanistan near Herat defected to the rebels with their heavy equipment and weapons as did a once-loyal army unit north of Kabul, which then reportedly raided the Soviet air base at Bagram.

Afghanistan will turn out to be the quagmire for the Soviets that Vietnam was for the United States or whether it will prove to be a successful thrust that establishes Soviet power near the oil-rich Persian Gulf is the key question.

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

RECRUITMENT

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

ALLENTOWN CALL (PA.)
23 January 1980

CIA application leaves nothing to imagination

By JUDY PEET
Of The Morning Call



Attention clerical workers: the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency ("An Equal Opportunity Employer") needs you.

The only requirements are U.S. citizenship, a high school diploma, typing, dictation — and a full accounting of the last 15 years of your life.

"They (potential CIA employees) will be in daily contact with classified material. We cannot afford to have someone from a foreign government walk through our door," said recruiter Charlotte Jacobs yesterday during the second of two days of recruitment interviews in the Holiday Inn East.

Which is another way of saying employment with the CIA and any shreds of privacy are distinctly incompatible.

It's also a way of saying that the CIA employee was not made in a day. It takes a day to complete the preliminary application form ("Are there any incidents in your life which you desire to explain?") aptitude tests and the 16-page official application form.

Then the agency takes four-six months to find out if you were telling the truth.

You don't have to answer every question, but they probably won't hire you if you don't. Actually, with the right attitude, application to the CIA can become an in-depth trip down memory lane.

For instance, can you remember the address, telephone number and zip code of where you lived 15 years ago?

Did you ever join a club with any branches in a foreign country?

Did your mother ever join a club with any branches in a foreign country?

Can you account for where you were and what you were doing any time you weren't working in the last 15 years?

Were you ever court martialed?

Investigated?

Fired?

Divorced? Separated? Annulled? (when, where and whose fault was it?)

Do you or any of your relatives advocate totalitarianism, fascism, communism or denying someone else's constitutional rights? Do you know where your relatives live, work, and if they come in frequent contact with foreigners?

If they died, do you know the cause of death?

Kind of an official "This Is Your Life" trivia quiz.

CONTINUED

To make things even more exciting, you get to take a lie detector test about the official application form. You can refuse, but they probably won't hire you.

Aside from these few security matters, the recruiters rush to add, working for the CIA is just like any other job. Pay is in accordance with civil service guidelines, with standard holidays and benefits.

"Everyone associates us with the FBI and law enforcement, but we don't even carry weapons," insisted Arthur Delaney, another of the three persons the agency uses to recruit clerical workers west of the Mississippi. "Our mission is only to collect and analyze intelligence."

According to Delaney, the recruiters' visit to the Lehigh Valley (their first since 1974) is solely for the purpose of interviewing prospective secretarial workers, not agents. Their tour started in Wilkes-Barre and will include Reading, Harrisburg and York.

SAN DIEGO UNION
20 January 1980

WANT ADS USED

CIA Recruits Special Few To Fill Ranks

By JAMES CARY
Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency is looking for a few special people with a spirit of adventure, according to its recruiting ads.

CIA officials say they are getting them, and by one estimate they are brighter, sharper and better informed than their predecessors of a decade or more ago.

After the turbulence of the Vietnam-Watergate period, officials at the agency's sprawling complex in suburban McLean, Va., recruit new talent much more aggressively, particularly among minorities.

And these days, CIA recruiters are welcome on virtually all U.S. campuses.

The agency is operating under a presidential executive order spelling out its duties, hopes to have a new charter soon, and perhaps legislation that will reduce from eight to two the number of congressional committees to which it reports.

As for the ads, they have been running in major newspapers across the nation for almost two years with what officials say are spectacular results — more than 13,500 responses to come-on lines that go like this:

"There aren't many of you. One in a thousand maybe. You're a bright, self-reliant, self-motivated person we need to help us gather information and put together a meaningful picture of what's happening in the world. One of an elite corps of men and women."

The ad also talks of a career, relying on wits; life in foreign places, and developing an ability to take charge.

Not only does that reflect the skills of the professional ad agency that drafted it (Gaynor and Duca, New York), but CIA recruiters are finding that placing the ad in certain news sections makes it more effective.

"The sports page is best," reports one recruiter. "Everyone reads the sports page." Another has found that placing a teaser line in life-style sections, directing attention to the CIA ad elsewhere in the paper, also attracts attention.

The advertisement is tailored to attract persons with broad educational backgrounds to go into training for assignment to intelligence collecting posts overseas.

But the agency runs other less flamboyant ads, too, some quietly seeking applications from telecommunications specialists and even clerks, typists and stenographers — one of the hardest skill areas to fill because so few persons specialize in these areas now.

"Most are after a degree," Alec T. Monroe, chief of the CIA recruitment division, said in an interview.

He points out the CIA has been recruiting since it was formed in 1947 because of the multiplicity of skills it must bring together to carry out what its own literature calls "the never-ending quest for an accurate and objective understanding of people and events throughout the world."

These include such diverse areas as electronic and optical engineers, linguistic specialists, technicians of all types, persons with advanced degrees in physics, international relations and other sciences, specialists in computer sciences, program analysts, systems programmers, research economists, and generalists with degrees in English and journalism.

If one of these persons, say an electronic engineer, also has a language skill that would permit him to interpret and understand foreign technical journals, he is of particular value to the CIA.

The CIA also maintains a national recruitment system operating openly out of 11 offices — in New York City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Chicago, Denver, Austin, Texas, Los Angeles, Boston and San Francisco.

It sends recruiters to nearly all professional association conventions to set up a booth, answer questions and provide informational literature.

It "taps in" — as Monroe puts it — to minority organizations such as the National Urban League, often advertises in their convention brochures and periodicals, keeps its information literature available at all U.S. job centers and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (formerly Civil Service Commission), and stays in very close touch with placement offices of all universities and colleges.

An ad in a college paper, or a posting on bulletin boards usually brings in dozens of students seeking interviews, information and application forms.

This is a far cry from the late 1960s and early 1970s when rampaging anti-Vietnam war demonstrators forced CIA recruiters to leave college campuses, sometimes held them captive in placement offices and generally tried to keep them from functioning.

"Actually we just shut down and opened up an office off-campus," Monroe said, adding the publicity in some cases seemed to increase the number of applicants.

Even at the height of the campus upheaval the CIA was able to obtain ample qualified college recruits, he said.

The CIA says it operates one of the best career development programs in the government, a system designed to help employees advance, if they have the talent, send them to school for special training, give them language skills and college degrees.

A typical applicant is asked to provide a resume, is interviewed if his background meshes with CIA needs, asked to fill out an application form, often put through tests and eventually given a security screening. If he survives this approximately 5.5-month processing he will be ready to take over a job.

Last year more than 100,000 serious applications were received. And while the CIA, for security reasons, will not say how many were hired, it does say "We're getting the cream of the crop."

Its own psychologists, who admit they are reasoning subjectively from a small unscientific sampling, report:

"Compared to 10 to 15 years ago the people we hire now are better qualified. Their intellectual ability is greater. They're smarter, have greater writing ability, are better informed . . . Some are definitely superior people."

This flow of talent is taking place despite the early and mid-1970s rash of investigations of the CIA by the Rockefeller Commission and congressional committees. This produced revelations of CIA involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende of Chile, of efforts to assassinate Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, and of experimenting dangerously with hallucinogenic drugs. Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, called the CIA "a rogue elephant."

"We weathered that," says a CIA spokesman. "Everything is much better now." One charge the CIA angrily refutes — that it unceremoniously discharged 800 agents and forced 2,000 others into retirement in a post-Vietnam war cleanup.

A spokesman says the CIA actually was heavily over strength in personnel assigned to the Directorate of Operations, the intelligence gathering branch, after the Vietnam war ended.

When Adm. Stansfield Turner took over as director he was under orders to cut back to normal staffing. He decided to do so over a period of 26 months that ended late last year.

Fewer than 20 were actually separated without a job, the spokesman says, and they received severance pay. Twenty-four others were aided in finding jobs outside the agency, 80 were reassigned within the agency and approximately 140 retired. Others were taken care of through normal attrition.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 72GRADUATING ENGINEER
WINTER 1980

Peter Hall

Uncle Sam Really Does Want You

A strong point in his favor is diversity: the U.S. military's public sector offers a dazzling array of jobs.



Air Force gives computer specialists "instant responsibility." Demand is acute for electrical engineers.

Uncle Sam is looking for engineering talent. He needs you—in some cases, desperately—and he's resorting to the same marketing techniques as his civilian colleagues in a mighty effort to prove that your country can do more for you than they can.

A strong point in Uncle Sam's favor is diversity: the U.S. military's public sector offers a dazzling array of jobs. Graduates can sign up for four years in the Air Force, where most will serve as project engineers in aerospace and weapons development.

Or they can go to sea, where the Navy offers a number of bonuses, especially for nuclear-trained submarine personnel. Those who disdain uniforms can seek a variety of jobs, even in covert operations at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or they can research and develop state-of-the-art electronic spy gear at the National Security Agency (NSA). They can join the civilian ranks of the Army Corps of Engineers, which annually exports 1,000 engineers to build military bases in the Middle East.

Unfortunately for government recruiters, however, too many students persist in taking the corporate route. Only the Coast Guard, which appreciates engineers, but does not actively recruit them, and the Marine Corps, which needs only 50 fresh officer-engineers per year, are satisfied. The rest report shortages, and the Air Force and Navy are beginning to suggest that long-range operations could be affected by the dearth of student interest.

A major reason for the problem is that hard cash is still the way to separate the future employers from the also-rans, and Uncle Sam's money is in short supply when it comes to bidding

for students. At a time when billion-dollar corporations complain that they are unable to compete with the oil companies' payroll power, government salary levels lag further behind every year.

Significantly the government's problem has proven far greater in filling uniformed ranks than in hiring civilians for the same services. Recruiters for the Army, Navy and Air Force civilian programs suffer annual disappointments, but fill in the gaps with more experienced engineers at higher Civil Service salaries. In attempting to sign graduating engineers for a round at officers' training school and a regular four-year hitch, however, the Air Force and Navy are clearly running short (the Army does not recruit engineer-officers). In the federal fiscal year that ended last fall, the Air Force set its first engineer recruitment quota—and filled only 197 of 672 projected openings. The Navy, which must operate 124 nuclear-powered surface and submarine vessels, missed its target by two-thirds, prompting administrators to decree that future classes at the Annapolis Naval Academy will be forced to make up the difference with enough nuclear-trained engineers, whether the midshipmen like it or not.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the oldest and most aggressive recruiter of civilians.

Certainly military salaries contribute to the problem: the purchasing power of soldiers' pay has dropped by some 17% when compared with the cost-of-living rise since 1972. But the uniform itself, and the lifestyle it entails,


clearly add to the service woes. As part of a more aggressive recruitment effort, one Air Force spokesman has come up with an interesting argument in favor of officers' braid. Captain John Daugherty, a Boston-based engineer turned recruiter, contends that those in uniform have it all over their civilian colleagues, at least in the Air Force. "The biggest difference is just learning how to wear a uniform," explains Daugherty, who spent almost a decade in systems procurement work after quitting a corporate design "factory" a year after graduating from the University of Cincinnati. "Civilians take their orders from the Air Force engineers. We like to wear our uniforms. It's easier to identify us on the job, and the contractors learn to look for us. It's a good image," he says proudly.

Continuing his pitch, Daugherty is cheerful about the officers who leave the Air Force after completing their tour. "We do not require experience, we provide it. People use the Air Force," he says. "After four years the average salary of those who leave us is probably \$4,000 to \$6,000 above their contemporaries because of their experience in management." A high-ranking CIA engineer pursues the same theme. "There are great opportunities to meet and know technical people through us. You can't lose."

Nevertheless, the shortages persist, especially in the uniformed ranks. The following is a description of the available jobs, salaries and benefits in the federal military agencies with engineering needs.

National Security Agency.

Established in 1952 under a secret presidential order, the NSA is today a worldwide communications interception network headquartered in Fort Meade, MD. Some 20,000 domestic employees supported by an annual \$1.5 billion budget routinely scan virtually all communications by the world's governments and organizations, including American allies. That task is becoming increasingly difficult because of advanced encoding techniques, however. Morale is considered to be high at the agency, which is itself one of the most secretive branches of the federal government. Prolonged congressional investigations several years ago revealed some illegal monitoring of internal U.S. communications, and some officials complained that too much information



of too little value was being collected. On the whole, though, the NSA won high praise for its efficiency in collecting and collating data, as well as ensuring the secrecy of U.S. communications.

In seeking up to 100 young engineers per year, agency recruiters boast that the NSA staff enjoys long, creative work weeks exploring electronic possibilities—the "cutting edge" of today's technology. Unlike his colleagues in other services, who tend to ignore the more traditional appeals to patriotism, Chief College Recruiter Greg DesRoches cites national service as one reason to join. "The position is very satisfying because of our involvement in the peacekeeping area, because we're aware," he says, explaining that swift, accurate monitoring of military planning and moves by other nations guarantees U.S. security and enables Washington to engage in disarmament talks. An NSA coup reportedly occurred at the second round of SALT talks when agency eavesdroppers intercepted the Soviet Union's bargaining instructions.

In addition to bonuses already being handed out to nuclear engineers who sign up again, or who work on submarines, the Navy is considering even larger bonuses to keep its officers on board for more than ten years.

DesRoches doesn't expect to meet his personnel targets this year, but he blames the general shortage of graduates and not the NSA's job package. "It's a tough market. There aren't enough to go around," he shrugs, "but from the electronic point of view, we offer opportunities that are almost unparalleled." These slots are

Aeronautical engineers review the schematics of jet aircraft engine components to ensure that they perform to precise specifications.

mostly for electrical engineers, with a few for power specialists, although DesRoches is hampered by security constraints in outlining exactly what sort of work his recruits will be doing.

A relatively strong point is the NSA's salary and benefit menu. Unlike civilian workers for the armed forces, NSA and CIA employees are exempted from federal Civil Service starting pay requirements, which are rigidly based on prior work experience, education and testing skills. Fresh talent may enter the ranks at a higher level, where DesRoches claims that salaries are "competitive" with those in the private sector—between \$18,000 and \$19,000 last year and certain to rise this year. One drawback: all federal civilians must pay 35% of the costs for their benefits, so the NSA-CIA are well below the fringes of the biggest and wealthiest corporations, but above those with more meager offerings.

As everyone but the Navy recruiters, the NSA spokesman stresses that agency work means regular, high-level cooperation with corporate designers and managers. Those who tire of the long workweeks ("We are by no means a 40-hour agency. . . the caliber of the work is so good that the people just like to get involved in it") often secure corporate jobs on the other side of the same R&D projects, "so we still have the benefit of their brains," DesRoches adds.

Most NSA employees work in a modern, nine-story building in suburban Fort Meade, although travel opportunities exist for seasoned staffers who wish to operate in one of the

agency's hundreds of listening posts around the world. Assignments are not usually risky, although the U.S.S. Pueblo—captured by North Korea—and the U.S.S. Liberty—bombed by the Israelis—were both NSA spy ships operated by the Navy.

Central Intelligence Agency. The older U.S. espionage unit carries on a far broader range of functions than the NSA, although supporters and critics agree that safe, distant, technological surveillance methods increasingly occupy the CIA staff. Described as a multibillion-dollar conglomerate and headquartered in Langley, VA, the agency's image has suffered in recent years as outsiders questioned its structure, goals and efficiency. Insiders, meanwhile, were torn between technological trends toward electronic intelligence (ELINT) and the old-line cloak-and-dagger missions (HUMINT). Today time, bad publicity and some forced retirements have set the CIA firmly on the R&D path; many, if not most, of the paramilitary advocates have left the agency, and a long-awaited Congressional charter is eventually expected to strengthen the hand of those who advocate more analysis and less intervention from outsiders.

Spokesmen at the CIA are understandably reluctant to discuss reports of morale problems, and are further hampered by the fact that espionage victories often become defeats when they are publicly announced. Even some of the CIA's technical breakthroughs, such as the 1963 development of the SR-71—the world's most sophisticated spy plane—prove frustrating. After several years of infighting, the sleek, black jet was handed over to the Air Force, which uses it in such missions as last October's heralded reconnaissance flights over Cuba.

Engineers hold a number of critical management posts at the CIA, and they like to stress that individuals may shift from job to job, developing an array of practical skills.

Some of the CIA's work distinctly parallels and even overlaps that of the NSA, and this is reflected in both agencies' hunger for EEs. Both offer similar salaries and benefits, but the CIA's needs are larger and take in a



Mechanical engineers are needed by the Air Force, the CIA, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy.

wider range of skills, including aerospace, nuclear, mechanical and even some civil specialists. Engineers hold a number of critical management posts at the CIA, and they like to stress that individuals may shift from job to job, developing an array of practical skills.

What does the CIA look for in its recruits? First, administrators at Langley look longer and harder than their corporate counterparts, which may explain why staff turnover rates are low, despite the image problems. "It's a different process to hire someone for the agency because of the security problems and process. We delve a little deeper," explains Ray Unger of the CIA's National Photographic Intelligence Center. New employees are given a three-year trial period, somewhat like those granted to college professors, before they are accepted as permanent staffers. The target, according to James C. Smith, deputy recruiting chief, is a U.S. citizen with a lot of motivation. "You don't have the time to provide direct management and supervision," he says. "You look for a great deal of working on your own and investigating on your own—a natural curiosity and looking for answers." Women and minorities are especially welcome, as they are for all but still-off-limits combat roles in the military.

Specifically, the CIA's many directorates, each with a bundle of sections, require vastly different skills. Timothy Stone, an engineer-manager in the Office of Scientific Intelligence,

wants electronics specialists with particular strength in physics, mathematics or computer science. Another more reclusive engineer known only as "Tony" explains that his Real Estate and Construction Division needs electrical, mechanical and civil engineers, technologists and technicians. Unger's photographic intelligence operation has openings for electrical engineers and physicists willing to be trained in such exotic new skills as imagery technology and remote sensing. And "Dick's" communications section has the same basic needs as the NSA.

If present trends at Langley continue, recruits can expect few projects like the suitcase-airplane that was once proposed as a means of flying American spies out of China. Opportunities to travel, however (in dangerous areas, or "nice ones at rotten times," as one spokesman put it), still exist. Engineers who seek covert action may even qualify for special retirement allowances. Generally, though, an engineering student looking for safe R&D work can find it at the CIA and NSA.

EXCERPTED.

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ON PAGE 223

GRADUATING ENGINEER
WINTER 1980

Central Intelligence Agency

We're looking for engineers who want more challenges, excitement, and rewards.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

THE WASHINGTON STAR

3 February 1980

CIA Found Too Weakened To Tackle New Demands

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The well-publicized traumas of the CIA have left it weakened as it attempts to deal with the perils now facing the United States around the world, according to a number of present and former officials in the intelligence community.

The administration is now moving to unleash the agency from some of

First of two articles

the restrictions placed on it as a result of revelations of past abuses. While President Carter's declaration of his determination to defend vital American interests in the Persian Gulf region "by any means necessary" focused public attention on military actions, it also meant new needs for CIA intelligence-gathering and covert activities.

But, the sources say, there is not as much at Langley to unleash as the government might now feel it needs. Experience and expertise has given way to bureaucratic management, and morale is too low for the kind of willingness to take initiatives that are the spark of a dangerous business, according to many sources.

And, even if the CIA were in better condition, warn both intelligence experts and administration users of their product, an unleashed agency cannot provide a "quick fix" for the hazards ahead in the sharpening U.S. confrontation with the Soviet Union.

"The whole discussion of unleashing the agency is just a red herring to distract attention from the more serious problem of how it's deteriorated," says one expert.

There is disagreement over just how bad the situation is or where the responsibility lies. One former senior CIA official cautions that only the president, possibly his national security adviser, and maybe the two congressional committees on intelligence have enough information and detachment to judge.

Retired Admiral Stansfield Turner, the director of the CIA and head of the government's entire intelligence apparatus, says he is optimistic about the agency's capabilities. Although nothing is perfect,

he says, the CIA has adequate resources for its tasks.

Others say that capabilities have been wasted or thrown away, including some that are now critically needed in the Middle East. Analysis of information collected by spies, reconnaissance satellites and other sources is poor, with the experts' own findings sometimes ignored by Turner in sending evaluations to the White House, these sources say.

They contend that Turner is just trying to paint the best possible picture of his almost three years of responsibility for the agency.

While his numerous critics blame him for many of its difficulties, they agree with him that a lot of problems go back before Carter took his old Annapolis classmate out of the Navy and gave him the intelligence job. One of these problems is a shortage of language talents.

At a time when Iran and Afghanistan are crisis areas, for instance, the CIA has very few people who are fluent in their main languages, Farsi and Dari. Training agents who can work effectively in such languages takes more than year.

The agency also is said by many sources to have a severe shortage of people qualified to handle the kind of paramilitary operations that might become desirable in trouble areas from Afghanistan to increasingly disturbed Central American countries.

There are, for instance, few agents capable of helping the Afghan guerrillas resisting the Soviet occupation, should the administration want to get that involved.

Turner's personnel policies have struck particularly hard at the operational part of the agency, slashing the size of the paramilitary cadre that runs guerrilla operations and demoralizing agents, sources say.

'Better Equipped Today'

In an interview, however, Turner claimed that, "in the covert action field, we are better equipped today than we were three years ago." He added, "I'm optimistic that morale in the agency has turned around."

This sharp contrast between what is said by Turner and the consistent views of numerous present and past officials shows how controversial the CIA has become — in a new way.

The controversy over the agency in the mid-1970s was over misuse of its powers at home and abroad. Then there was a public perception that the CIA had the talent to do almost anything, but its abilities had been perverted.

There was horror on Capitol Hill over opening of Americans' mail and other domestic surveillance activities, experimenting with drugs on unwitting citizens, and other actions that indicated the agency had turned inward instead of limiting itself to the foreign field. Some foreign actions such as assassination plots also aroused strong public and congressional opposition.

The result was the placing of specific restrictions on the CIA. One was aimed at covert actions, which Turner defines as "attempting to influence the course of events in other countries without the source of influence being apparent."

Carter called in his State of the Union message Jan. 23 for loosening the restrictions. He asked "clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies."

"We will guarantee that abuses do not recur," Carter said, "but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence."

The restriction on covert activity was in an amendment placed on the Foreign Aid Act in December 1974. It was introduced by Sen. Harold Hughes, D-Iowa, and Rep. Leo Ryan, D-Calif.

Intelligence Gathering Goal

The Hughes-Ryan amendment limits the CIA to "activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the president finds that each such operation is important to the national security and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress."

The "appropriate committees" were found to be eight — those from each house established especially for intelligence oversight and those dealing with foreign affairs, defense and appropriations. Their memberships, with some overlapping, total 222, and some 40 of their staff members are also involved in handling reports.

CONTINUED

The House Armed Services Committee decided against hearing such reports, however, on the grounds that its two members who were on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence could represent it. So seven committees have been getting reports.

A senior staff member of one committee says that there have only been six or seven occasions in the last five years when the administration has made reports on covert activities. Two early cases of leaks to the press, about payments to King Hussein of Jordan and to Italian political parties, inhibited further reporting and therefore — presumably — further covert activities.

First President Gerald R. Ford and later Carter issued "general findings" that exempted two kinds of covert activity from detailed congressional reporting. They are CIA attempts to thwart international narcotics operations and international terrorism.

While refusing to give an explicit confirmation of these two exemptions, Turner said: "There's a regular, routine, formal procedure for insuring that we're not carrying out a general finding in a specific country where they don't want us to for some reason. So it's far from a blank check."

Changing the Hughes-Ryan reporting requirement is one part of the effort to relax restrictions on the CIA. The administration and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are in general agreement on reducing the requirement from eight to just the Senate and the House intelligence committees, whose memberships total 29. The nature of the reporting itself is also expected to be changed.

There are two other parts to the unleashing package being pushed by the administration. One is an Intelligence Identities Protection Act and the other is a modification of the Freedom of Information Act.

The 'Agee Act'

The first is widely known as "the Agee act" because it is aimed at the problem exemplified by former CIA agent Philip Agee. He had made a career of exposing the identity of CIA people working undercover.

The act "would help to get at people who deliberately uncover the identities of our people or our agents when we have definitely tried to establish their anonymity," Turner said. But its terms have aroused opposition on freedom of speech grounds, and even the Justice Department has expressed doubts.

Turner said there is a broader principle involved in changing the legislative rules. "There was so much emphasis on (restrictions) in the past few years," he said, that "our people deserve to be told what they're allowed to do."

"They must be told what they can't do. (But) if you put too much in the can't-do, you tie the organization's hands," the CIA director said. "Once it's in law, it's inflexible."

Turner cited with satisfaction the passage in Carter's State of the Union message on the CIA.

There is no doubt in the intelligence community that Turner has established new controls and procedures within the CIA. But the effect of them is widely deplored.

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ON PAGE AS

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
5 February 1980

Turner 'Very Optimistic' About CIA's Future

But Critics Despair That Spy Agency Can't Do Good Job

Second of two articles

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Looking casual in a navy blue cardigan but speaking intensely, Stansfield Turner gazed out the glass wall of his office, atop the CIA headquarters at Langley, over the bare dusky woods toward the distant lights of Washington and exuded confidence about his organization.

"I'm just very optimistic these days," Turner said. "I've been very impressed by the quality of our human intelligence activities," the CIA director said. And U.S. technical intelligence is superlative, he added.

In other government offices in the city, most of them looking across concrete courtyards at other offices instead of having spacious views, in the private offices of people who have left the government, in small restaurants, in telephone calls from coast to coast, others talk about the CIA, too.

Some, like former CIA Director William E. Colby and former Deputy Director Enno Henry Knoche, talk for quotation about things like restrictions on the agency. But most prefer to discuss the agency's problems from the protection of anonymity.

Turner understandably is angered by this, especially on the most emotional aspect of his three-year tenure at Langley, the forced retirement of people from the clandestine services. He argues that he rejuvenated an aging agency.

"The next time someone tells you," he said, "that Turner is the stupid bastard who cut the size of the agency out here, look at the color of his hair. . . . This is a young man's game, and we are better equipped today than we were three years ago" for clandestine operations.

The CIA is composed of three main branches. The clandestine or operations branch handles spying and covert operations, like intervening secretly in other countries' affairs or organizing guerrilla movements. Another branch supervises technical intelligence, including reconnaissance satellite photography and communications intercepts. An analytical branch pulls information together for government policymakers.

The controversy that has marked Turner's almost three years at the agency focuses on the operations branch. There is also widespread but less publicized distress around Washington about analysis.

In both cases, Turner inherited problems. His critics say he exacerbated them; his supporters contend that he has done much to clear them up.

Once Was Twice as Large

The Vietnam war and the CIA's "secret army" in Laos, added to worldwide spying, pushed the number of agency operatives to 8,500 in the late 1960s — roughly double its present size. As the Nixon administration began to reduce U.S. commitments in Indochina, personnel had to be reduced by attrition, transfers and other means.

During his brief tenure as CIA director, James R. Schlesinger speeded up a cutback. Colby, his successor, continued the program, and so did George Bush during his year as director. Most sources agree that they were handled sensibly.

Then President Carter took Turner from his navy admiral's command and sent him to Langley. He arrived with what the old CIA hands considered to be a skeptical, even hostile, attitude.

This set a chilly tone to his take-over, despite his own explanations that he simply wanted to bring better management to a sometimes uncoordinated operation. His suspicions of the need for drastic changes were quickly reinforced by the resignation of John Stockwell, a 40-year-old agent in the unsuccessful CIA effort in Angola.

Stockwell charged that a clique of burned-out, old clandestine services officials was running the agency into the ground. Turner heard this and other grievances, rejected advice on alternatives for dealing with them and launched the "Halloween massacre."

After announcing in August 1977 that 816 jobs in the operations branch would be cut by 1979, Turner sent out the first 212 pink slips on Oct. 31, 1977.

Although smaller than previous cuts, this one was handled differently and hit harder at lifetime professionals in the spying and paramilitary trades.

Says Cuts Helped Agency

"The cuts in personnel that everyone still complains to me about have strengthened the agency's covert action capabilities," Turner said.

"You don't run a good, strong paramilitary or covert action program with a bunch of 55-year-olds," he said. "What I've done is cut out high-grade superstructure . . . and doubled the input into the clandestine services . . . so that we have a group of young tigers, and there's enough accumulated experience and expertise around to guide them."

This is strongly challenged by people in a position to know.

"Whatever Turner says, they can't put on a show," says a Pentagon official who is very familiar with the CIA's present operational capabilities. "We know that over in this building."

Other sources spell this out in more detail. One says the CIA's corps of paramilitary specialists who could help organize, for instance, a more effective Afghan resistance to Soviet control has declined from about 200 to 80, and many of the 80 lack the broad experience needed for effectiveness.

But Colby comments that, if the people in an operational area feel CIA help is vital, they will find ways to speed it up.

The worst part of Turner's changes, numerous present and retired officials say, is what they did to CIA morale. While he recognizes that morale suffered, but contends it is now coming back up, others say that it is at best bumping along sideways.

Several sources cite cases of Turner's failure to back up agents who got in trouble taking risks that were known and accepted by the agency in advance as normal for the job.

Knoche, who was the deputy CIA director when Turner arrived and worked for him a few months, says that "the premium has been in the last few years on not rippling the water, on being non-controversial and not getting in trouble. In this profession, that's the wrong attitude, and now the chickens may have come home to roost" as a result both of too much congressional oversight and of Turner's policies.

"A spy agency is always going to have some people who bend rules or play close to the limits of them," Knoche added. "In peacetime they can be a bureaucratic nuisance, but they may be just the kind of people you need when you run into a crisis."

They are the kind of people who have not fitted into Turner's desire for managerial tidiness and career regularity. The result, many sources say, is that the CIA is poorer without them — and so is the country.

The picture derived from extensive inquiries is of a deadened, demoralized organization. But Turner contends otherwise.

"When I got here," he said, "the agency was just about maturing in the end of its first working generation, 30 years roughly, and a lot of the procedures were still geared to the small Ivy League club that came out of the OSS (the World War II Office of Strategic Services), and a lot of the procedures were stultified after 30 years, and if there's one thing you have to have in this kind of business it's dynamic, imaginative, forward-looking people."

"The principal things I have tried to do have been to instill that sense," Turner said.

Turner went to the old Ivy League club in an effort to improve the quality of CIA analysis. He put the analysis branch under Robert R. Bowie, who at the age of 68 in 1977 had been the head of the State Department's policy planning and then had run Harvard's Center for International Affairs for 15 years.


Bowie expected to be a senior intellectual in residence to advise Turner. Instead, he had to supervise some 1,500 analysts. By most accounts, it was a bureaucratic failure that did nothing to sort out organizational problems in analysis or improve the quality.

Colby had sought improvements by establishing a system of national intelligence officers (NIO), with each NIO responsible for final judgments on a particular country or area. If the system ever worked, it is working poorly now, a number of experts in the intelligence community feel.

In some cases the NIO's lack the background for making final judgments among conflicting interpretations. The present NIO for a very important country, for instance, was distinguished several years ago when he was a diplomat in that country for being totally wrong about its political developments.

Sometimes all of the experts from around town on a particular country or subject are assembled by the CIA to discuss it. But what the NIO later writes up bears little resemblance to the collective wisdom, some experts complain. And Turner himself has been known to change analytical conclusions before sending them to the White House.

The result is worse than frustration for many experts. It is a feeling that the kind of myopia that led to a 1973 CIA finding of the shah's being solidly in control can be too easily repeated — although there now seems to be a developing tendency at the agency to adopt a protective posture of leaning over the other direction by being free with warnings of trouble.



STANSFIELD TURNER
Defends actions

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

MISCELLANEOUS

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501350001-0

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C 4

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MO)
30 January 1980

The CIA And 'Censoring'

As to your editorial titled, "Censorship Considered," on Dec. 26, 1979: First of all the Central Intelligence Agency has never admitted that Mr. Snapp's book contained no classified information. Snapp was taken to court for violating his secrecy agreement with this agency — an agreement determined by the court to be a binding and legal contract.

Second, the intransigence of Mr. Frank Snapp in violating the terms of the secrecy agreement he signed as an agency employee relates in no way to authors who have never taken such an oath — nor to freedom of the press.

I am chairman of the Publications Review Board, that body which reviews manuscripts to ascertain

whether they contain legitimate classified material identified under existing statutes. We do not "clear" or "censor" manuscripts. It may interest you to know that in the past three years we have reviewed 198 manuscripts and disapproved only three for security reasons. The agency regulation which specifies the duties of the Publications Review Board states in part, "Approval will not be denied solely because the subject matter may be embarrassing to or critical of the agency."

Herbert E. Hetu
Director of Public Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington

*They finally printed
one of our letters*
11

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
26 DECEMBER 1979

Censorship Considered

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has had months to consider the case of Frank Snepp — from whom the government has been trying to collect damages for writing a book about the CIA without clearance — the justices apparently are still unable to decide what action, if any, to take on this suit that has broad implications for freedom of the press. Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a federal district judge's decision that former CIA agent Snepp, in writing without agency clearance a book about the blunders of the CIA in the last days before the U.S. evacuation of Saigon, had violated the oath of secrecy he took as an agent.

Even though the CIA admitted that the book contained no classified material, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment that Mr. Snepp was required for the rest of his life to submit for clearance any speech or written work (even fiction) that might touch on the agency. The Court of

Appeals did not, however, accept the trial judge's farfetched ruling that the secrecy oath conferred on the government a "constructive trust" that, if the oath was violated, entitled the U.S. to all money made on the book. The appellate court held that this rule would only apply if the author wrote about secret matters.

Even the narrower ruling of the Court of Appeals poses a grave threat to the free speech and press rights not only of many former government employees but of other authors who make use of such materials and of their publishers. By upholding the secrecy oath rationale of the Snepp case, the Supreme Court conceivably might even be able to penalize the writing of a book like "The Brethren," a newly published work about the high court. Whatever one may think of such exposes, the government should not be able to censor books, especially those by writers with inside knowledge of the public's business.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3WASHINGTON STAR
6 February 1980

Carter Ad Bends Rules As CIA, State Get Role

By Jack W. Germond

Washington Star Political Editor

PORTLAND, Maine — In a sharp break with traditional political practice, President Carter is using top officials of the State Department and the CIA as props in a television ad being shown in New England this week.

The ad, which runs less than five minutes, shows the president discussing a decision on aid to Nicaragua with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and CIA Director Stansfield Turner.

Neither Christopher or Turner is depicted making any partisan statements for Carter. Instead, the commercial is intended to convey a picture of the difficult decisions the president is obliged to make.

But the unwritten rule in politics has been that both the State Department and CIA, as well as Justice Department and Department of Defense, are kept entirely free of involvement in partisan politics. It has been acceptable for presidents to use the secretaries of such departments as Agriculture, Labor and Commerce as campaign surrogates, but that freedom has never applied to those dealing with the defense or foreign policy.

The ad is only one measure of the extent to which Carter is going to exploit the national security issue and the support he has evoked from the electorate on Iran and Afghanistan.

In Maine, Carter is also getting public backing and active campaigning from Kenneth Curtis, the ambassador to Canada — another break with normal political practice. Curtis, a former governor of the state, was traveling here yesterday with Vice President Walter Mondale, who defended the partisan activity by an ambassador. "He's entitled to do that," Mondale said at a news conference in Kittery. "He's a citizen of Maine and he's here on his own time."

In fact, the most visible example of the way Carter is exploiting the international situation is in Mondale's own campaigning for him. In appearance after appearance here, over the last two days, the vice president has been stressing Carter's response on Afghanistan as a contrast between the kind of leadership he offers and that which might be provided by his opponents.

Thus, while the White House insists it is avoiding partisanship because of the international situation, the president's chief surrogate is boasting about Carter's conduct in the crisis as he seeks support for Carter against Sen. Edward Kennedy in the Maine Democratic caucuses next Sunday.

The body of Mondale's speech for Carter is just what it has been for months — praise for the administration's record in creating jobs, reforming the Social Security system, reducing the deficit, helping the cities and the like. Mondale also uses his own reputation as a Democratic liberal as a credential for Carter. Citing his own long association with Hubert Humphrey, Mondale tells one audience after another: "We've got a caring, compassionate president. . . . I think I know a progressive when I see one."

But these days the piece de resistance of the Mondale pitch is that the Carter response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan is the reason he deserves support in the Democratic contest for the nomination. Mondale sets up straw men and then knocks them over. "The first thing we could do is start a war," the vice president told a meeting of supporters at Kittery. "The second thing we could do is send them a mean note — get the dictionary out and send them a real zinger."

Instead, Mondale argues, the president took a series of "tough steps" that have produced favorable results, including the release of the six hostages rescued by Canada and the U.N. resolution condemning the Soviet invasion.

Mondale says all of these steps Carter took — including the embargo on grain shipments and the move to cancel the Olympics — were "very controversial" and could have caused him grievous political harm.

There is inevitable applause when he adds: "I believe the American people support this strong leadership."

In fact, the steps Carter has taken now have been shown by the public opinion polls to have widespread backing among the voters. But Mondale and his advisers argue that they make a valid political point because both Kennedy and most of Carter's Republican opponents disagree with the president on most of the measures.

THE MESA TRIBUNE (AZ.)
30 January 1980

CIA agent exposure is threat to intelligence, official says

WASHINGTON (AP) — A top CIA official told Congress today that a new law is urgently needed to stop intelligence operatives from being "fair game" for dangerous exposure by fellow Americans.

Publicly identifying intelligence agents not only threatens their careers — and sometimes their lives — but reduces the likelihood that informants will continue to help U.S. intelligence efforts, said Frank Carlucci, deputy director of the CIA.

"We are increasingly being asked to explain how we can guarantee the safety of individuals who cooperate with us when we cannot protect our own officers from exposure," Carlucci told a House Intelligence subcommittee.

"Some immediately discernible results of continuing disclosures include reduction of contact and reduced passage of information" by major foreign intelligence services, he added.

Carlucci was testifying in favor of a bill, co-sponsored by all 14 members of the Intelligence Committee, to spell out criminal penalties for "blowing the cover" of a secret agent or his secret sources of information.

The committee hearing came amid growing congressional concern about U.S. intelligence in light of international events. And Carlucci said, "Recent world events have dramatically demonstrated the importance of maintaining a strong and effective intelligence apparatus."

A number of representatives and senators have been call-

ing for legislation to cut public access to intelligence activities and to lift various restraints Congress slapped on intelligence agencies in the mid-1970s.

Congress voted for the restraints after revelation of various abuses including assassination plots against foreigners and CIA infiltration of American anti-war groups during the 1960s.

Indicating bi-partisan support for changes, Senate Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd and acting Republican Leader Ted Stevens have both said in recent days that the pendulum has swung too far the other way since Congress imposed the restraints.

Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan — and feelings that the United States needs better intelligence information — have led several members of Congress to renew their work toward overall revamping of the CIA charter.

The bill to protect agents, a less sweeping step, would call for a prison sentence of up to 10 years and a fine of up to \$50,000 for anyone who uses access to classified information to reveal the identity of a secret agent or informant.

Private citizens with no formal access to classified information also could be fined or imprisoned if they revealed an agent or informant's name "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

The penalty for such private citizens would be limited to one year in prison and a \$5,000 fine.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
5 February 1980

Courts and the CIA



HOLDEN

The Sunday Times of London has sued the CIA for information it may have about the 1977 murder in Egypt of its chief foreign correspondent, David Shipley Holden. The complaint, filed in U.S. district court in New York yesterday, said that despite the "exceptional urgency" of the investigation into the unsolved murder, the CIA has refused to expedite a Sunday Times request for information initially made 17 months ago. The complaint said the CIA reaction to the initial request for information — made in August 1978 under the Freedom of Information Act — was that it would take at least six months to respond because of a backlog of 2,300 unprocessed cases. . . . A federal appeals court in Washington issued a 24-hour stay yesterday of U.S. District Judge Gerhard Gesell's order requiring the State Department to restore former CIA agent Philip Agee's passport.

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ON PAGE C-1

WASHINGTON STAR
6 February 1980

THE EAR

UNBLOCKED . . . There's a teeny wave of panic at the CIA, Ear hears. With the great Morale Slump in the wake of the Iran and Afghanistan Experiences, lots of hotshot Company Men are seeking out shrinks. Now, The Agency, sweetly, keeps a passel of Company Shrinks on tap, to hear Troubled Agents' woes. This way, Our Boys won't flop on outside couches, change their socks and spill the beans. Suddenly, a nasty note: All Company Men are *not* going to Company Cranium-meisters with their little secrets. Are they naughtily seeing Shrinks of Their Choice on the outside? Ear cannot tell. But Ear hears for sure that Deputy Director Frank Carlucci has launched a mission to track down horizontal tattlers and Bung Up The Leaks.

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ON PAGE 23

THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX-REPORT NO. 172
NOVEMBER 1979

RATINGS OF ORGANIZATIONS

EXCERPTED

In comparison with the KKK, the five other organizations included in the latest survey are highly regarded by the American public. The FBI is the most respected organization tested, with 81 percent of the public viewing it favorably, followed by the AFL-CIO and the CIA, with positive ratings of 63 and 62 percent, respectively.

CONTINUED

*Really significant -
Speech material?
H*

The two remaining organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), have favorable ratings of only 43 and 42 percent. It should be pointed out, however, that the comparatively low positive ratings

for the ACLU and the NAM appear to be largely the result of the public's lack of familiarity with these organizations. Although clear majorities of the people who are familiar with these organizations rate them favorably, significant proportions (35 and 49 percent) of the public are not familiar enough with them to assign any rating at all.

STAPEL SCALOMETER USED TO MEASURE VIEWS

The ratings in this report were obtained by a sensitive attitude scale called the Stapel Scalometer, which consists of 10 squares or boxes. The person being tested is given a card showing the squares and told the top square represents the highest degree of liking; the lowest square, the lowest degree. He or she is then asked to indicate how far up or down the scale he would place the organization he is asked to rate.

Highly favorable attitudes are the responses in the TOP two positions; highly unfavorable attitudes are the responses in the BOTTOM two scale positions.

Following are the national results and the existing trends:

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KKK

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1965</u>
Highly favorable	3%	4%	3%	1%
Total favorable	10	9	8	6
Highly unfavorable	66	68	75	76
Total unfavorable	83	82	86	84
Don't know.....	7	9	6	10

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ACLU

	<u>1979</u>
Highly favorable	14%
Total favorable	43
Highly unfavorable	8
Total unfavorable	22
Don't know.....	35

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE AFL-CIO

	<u>1979</u>
Highly favorable	20%
Total favorable	63
Highly unfavorable	9
Total unfavorable	24
Don't know.....	13

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CIA

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1973</u>
Highly favorable	17%	14%	23%
Total favorable	62	50	67
Highly unfavorable	8	16	7
Total unfavorable	24	39	19
Don't know.....	14	11	14

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FBI

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1965</u>
Highly favorable ..	37%	37%	52%	71%	85%
Total favorable ...	81	80	85	92	98
Highly unfavorable .	5	5	4	2	*
Total unfavorable ..	15	16	11	5	1
Don't know.....	4	4	4	3	1

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NAM

	<u>1979</u>
Highly favorable	10%
Total favorable	42
Highly unfavorable	3
Total unfavorable	9
Don't know.....	49

CONTINUED

RATINGS OF THE CIA

Question: "The boxes on this card go from the HIGHEST POSITION OF PLUS 5 — for an organization you like very much — all the way down to the LOWEST POSITION OF MINUS 5 — for an organization you dislike very much. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate each of the following organizations?" THE CIA

September 7 — 10, 1979

	<u>+ 5</u>	<u>+ 4</u>	<u>+ 3</u>	<u>+ 2</u>	<u>+ 1</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>- 1</u>	<u>- 2</u>	<u>- 3</u>	<u>- 4</u>	<u>- 5</u>
NATIONAL	8%	9%	13%	15%	17%	14%	8%	4%	4%	2%	6%
SEX											
Male	10	11	13	15	16	11	8	5	4	1	6
Female	7	8	14	14	18	16	8	4	4	2	5
RACE											
White	7	10	13	15	18	13	9	5	3	1	6
Non-white	19	7	13	11	10	18	5	3	5	3	6
EDUCATION											
College	4	8	15	16	21	5	10	8	4	2	7
High school	11	10	14	14	16	12	9	3	4	2	5
Grade school	10	11	6	13	12	36	3	3	2	1	3
REGION											
East	10	8	13	14	15	12	9	6	4	1	8
Midwest	6	9	13	16	17	15	9	4	5	2	4
South	11	9	15	13	19	14	6	3	3	2	5
West	6	12	13	16	16	12	10	4	3	3	5
AGE											
Total under 30	8	8	13	11	17	10	12	7	5	2	7
18 - 24 years	10	8	16	9	13	11	13	6	5	2	7
25 - 29 years	3	7	8	14	24	10	11	7	5	2	9
30 - 49 years	9	11	13	15	19	11	8	4	3	2	5
50 & older	9	9	13	16	15	19	6	3	3	2	5
INCOME											
\$20,000 & over	7	8	15	18	21	7	9	5	4	1	5
\$15,000 - \$19,999	9	11	14	12	16	12	9	5	3	2	7
\$10,000 - \$14,999	10	13	11	17	17	10	8	2	6	2	4
\$ 7,000 - \$ 9,999	7	8	18	10	17	18	6	4	3	3	6
\$ 5,000 - \$ 6,999	9	9	9	13	12	22	9	7	3	3	4
\$ 3,000 - \$ 4,999	10	4	7	12	14	31	6	6	2	1	7
Under \$3,000	10	9	7	11	11	31	11	1	1	1	7
POLITICS											
Republican	8	12	13	13	19	17	9	3	3	1	2
Democrat	10	9	14	15	15	13	8	5	3	3	5
Independent	6	8	13	15	19	12	8	5	5	1	8
RELIGION											
Protestant	10	8	13	15	19	14	8	4	3	1	5
Catholic	7	12	15	13	17	12	8	5	4	2	5
OCCUPATION											
Professional & business	5	8	14	20	19	6	11	6	3	2	6
Clerical & sales	8	7	14	9	24	9	13	5	3	4	4
Manual workers	9	11	13	13	16	15	8	3	5	1	6
Non-labor force	12	9	11	13	16	21	5	5	3	1	4
CITY SIZE											
1,000,000 & over	8	10	16	13	16	14	5	6	4	2	6
500,000 - 999,999	11	5	14	18	17	8	8	5	5	2	7
50,000 - 499,999	8	11	12	15	16	11	11	4	4	2	6
2,500 - 49,999	8	6	11	16	18	21	6	4	2	2	6
Under 2,500, rural	7	11	14	12	19	15	9	4	4	1	4
Labor union families	11	12	13	19	15	9	8	3	5	*	5
Non-labor union families	8	8	14	13	18	15	8	5	3	2	6

* Less than one percent.

CONTINUED

RATINGS OF THE FBI

Question: "The boxes on this card go from the HIGHEST POSITION OF PLUS 5 – for an organization you like very much – all the way down to the LOWEST POSITION OF MINUS 5 – for an organization you dislike very much. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate each of the following organizations?" THE FBI

September 7 - 10, 1979

	+ 5	+ 4	+ 3	+ 2	+ 1	Don't know	- 1	- 2	- 3	- 4	- 5
NATIONAL	22%	15%	19%	13%	12%	4%	5%	3%	2%	2%	3%
SEX											
Male	22	16	18	13	10	3	7	3	3	1	4
Female	23	13	20	13	14	4	4	3	2	2	2
RACE											
White	22	14	20	13	13	4	5	3	2	1	3
Non-white	27	18	16	8	7	4	4	6	4	1	5
EDUCATION											
College	11	11	19	20	17	2	8	4	2	2	4
High school	25	15	19	10	11	4	5	3	2	2	4
Grade school	33	20	20	8	7	6	2	3	1	*	*
REGION											
East	22	12	18	13	15	2	5	4	2	2	5
Midwest	18	19	20	12	13	5	6	2	2	1	2
South	31	14	17	12	9	3	3	4	2	2	3
West	15	12	23	13	11	6	9	2	3	2	4
AGE											
Total under 30	18	10	20	13	14	3	6	5	3	2	6
18 - 24 years	22	12	21	10	11	3	6	5	3	2	5
25 - 29 years	12	7	17	18	20	3	6	3	2	3	9
30 - 49 years	22	14	18	13	14	4	6	2	2	2	3
50 & older	27	19	20	11	9	4	5	2	2	*	1
INCOME											
\$20,000 & over	16	11	23	18	15	2	6	4	1	1	3
\$15,000 - \$19,999	20	17	17	12	12	4	8	2	3	2	3
\$10,000 - \$14,999	28	17	16	8	12	4	4	3	3	1	4
\$ 7,000 - \$ 9,999	24	19	15	8	16	4	2	4	4	2	2
\$ 5,000 - \$ 6,999	32	12	15	12	10	5	3	3	1	2	5
\$ 3,000 - \$ 4,999	23	10	27	12	6	7	5	3	1	3	3
Under \$3,000	25	23	16	10	3	3	7	2	4	*	7
POLITICS											
Republican	23	17	22	14	9	4	6	1	1	1	2
Democrat	26	15	20	11	11	3	4	4	2	2	2
Independent	18	12	17	14	15	3	7	3	4	2	5
RELIGION											
Protestant	25	16	19	12	12	3	5	3	2	1	2
Catholic	21	12	22	14	12	3	7	3	2	1	3
OCCUPATION											
Professional & business	14	11	21	18	16	3	6	3	2	3	3
Clerical & sales	18	16	20	7	13	2	9	8	3	3	1
Manual workers	26	16	16	12	12	4	4	3	2	1	4
Non-labor force	28	16	22	10	7	4	4	3	2	1	3
CITY SIZE											
1,000,000 & over	24	14	20	8	12	3	5	4	3	2	5
500,000 - 999,999	18	11	18	18	14	1	4	4	3	4	5
50,000 - 499,999	22	17	21	10	11	5	7	2	2	*	3
2,500 - 49,999	23	15	16	17	11	4	5	2	2	2	3
Under 2,500, rural	24	14	20	13	14	3	5	3	2	1	1
Labor union families	21	19	21	10	13	4	5	2	1	1	3
Non-labor union families	23	13	19	13	12	4	5	3	3	2	3

* Less than one percent.

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ON PAGE A26

THE NEW YORK TIMES
6 February 1980

Letters


Our Wrong Rush to Unleash the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

Prominent members of the Senate, some members of the Select Committee on Intelligence and some not, have jumped eagerly on the President's State of the Union call for the removal of restraints on U.S. intelligence collection capabilities. Apparently they see the President's suddenly militant temper as providing an opportunity to sidetrack, delay or amend radically the elaborate and carefully negotiated charter for intelligence activities.

Priority now would go to negotiating with the Administration agreements on three points that would dilute the draft charter: reduction of Congressional oversight obligations, tightening control of sensitive materials and providing legal penalties for making certain public disclosures. Whether the charter, which offers a comprehensive juridical context for the intelligence community, will now ever see the light of day in anything near its original form is problematic; the current mood in the Congress and the White House does not encourage optimism.

Both the President's remarks and the senators' reactions to them point to the probability that the ultimate objective of both is to revive C.I.A.'s clandestine services — or what is left of them after several years of trimming and enforced restraint. The fact that clandestine activities have been under restraint not for reasons of economy but because of overwhelming public distaste for past operational abuses can hardly be forgotten, even by the notoriously short memories of Congressmen and Presidents. Nonetheless the rush "to unleash the C.I.A." seems



David Suter

to be on, perhaps as a rueful response to those who, when the American hostages were first taken in Iran, grumbled that if the military could not liberate them, a massive clandestine operation might.

Romanticism of this sort always emerges in times of national indignation. That is why it is so important to reiterate soberly the costs of such a rash policy; that is why the hard questions raised by past lessons must be put again:

- Have clandestine activities on balance succeeded or failed? The record in Iran alone is not encouraging in this respect.

- On a larger scale, were clandestine activities of the 1960's and early 1970's worth the damage to U.S. stand-

ing in the world community that their exposure produced?

- Can, or should, the U.S. once again risk exposing dedicated professional officers to the temptations of acting outside traditional legal confines? In the past these temptations have, *inter alia*, led to assassination plots, illegal tampering with U.S. students at home and mortally dangerous drug experiments.

- What do we do with clandestine operatives after immediate international dangers and tensions have subsided? Are they once more to be kept busy making unnecessary mischief around the world?

- Finally, will not the appropriate and legitimate analytic and judgmental functions of the C.I.A. and the other parts of the intelligence community be compromised by official skepticism engendered by heavy-handed clandestine activities?

Surely, the President, confronted by an intractable medieval theocracy and by a suddenly adventuresome Soviet Union, needs the tools to reshape foreign policy. Selecting the proper tools for the job, however, is as significant an aspect of Presidential responsibility as using them. The responsibility of the President and the Congress will continue when the immediate crises have passed. Neither party should rush to use short-term tools of convenience that can only have ugly long-term consequences.

E. DREXEL GODFREY JR.
Newark, Jan. 28, 1980

The writer, director of the Masters Program in Public Administration at Rutgers University, is a former C.I.A. director of current intelligence.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
6 February 1980

Jack Anderson

Technology of U.S. Benefits Soviets

Any suggestion that American officials and businessmen helped the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan would raise cries of outrage from the White House and Wall Street alike.

Unfortunately, it happens to be true.

Both the military trucks and the transport jets that disgorged Red Army troops and supplies in Afghanistan during Christmas week were built with the indispensable technological know-how provided by profit-hungry U.S. firms and approved by high-level U.S. officials.

In an incredible replay of pre-Pearl Harbor days, when American businessmen sold the Japanese war machine scrap metal that later rained down on U.S. and allied troops in the Pacific, we have been selling the technically backward Russians U.S. computers and other sophisticated equipment that have enabled the Kremlin to threaten our economic lifeline in the Middle East.

For years, I have warned against the openhanded giveaway of American technology—the one field in which the United States was clearly miles ahead of the Soviet Union. There was one momentary success: A May 24, 1977, column stopped the shipment to Russia of a Control Data computer, which was more than a decade ahead of the Soviets' own technology.

I also published warnings against the sale of other sophisticated equipment to the Russians, including IBM computers. But the warnings were drowned out by eager corporate salesmen and an administration eager to believe the Russians. The CIA has now

learned that the IBM computers were used to build military trucks, which hauled Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

Over the objections of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) and members of the National Security Council, President Carter personally approved the sale of \$144 million worth of sophisticated equipment, ostensibly to be used by the Soviets for deep-well oil drilling. Experts cautioned that the American machinery could easily be converted to the manufacture of antitank ammunition.

To quiet critics of the deal, Carter appointed a special task force of technological experts, headed by Fred Bucy, chairman of Texas Instruments, to study the sale. But it went through anyway.

According to Dr. Miles Costick of the Institute on Strategic Trade, the Russians also acquired their know-how to build wide-bodied jet transports from American firms. The Soviets' technique was simple: "They kept after the three U.S. aircraft firms bidding on a contract to submit more and more detailed information—until the Russians had enough data to build their own planes."

Costick also said the Soviets went so far as to send their technologists to U.S. plants wearing special shoes that picked up traces of the special alloy metals used in construction of American products.

Armored cars and amphibious vehicles produced at the Gorki automobile plant were built with technical assistance from the Ford Motor Co. Truck chassis used for antiaircraft and anti-

tank guns were made at a factory outfitted by U.S. firms.

Submarine detection devices that make our Trident submarine vulnerable were developed with the help of equipment the Russians bought from Geospace Corp. and Latton Industries.

President Carter personally approved the sale of a Sperry Rand Univac 1100/10C computer the Kremlin had been thirsting after for two years. According to intelligence sources who talked to my reporters Vicki Warren and Mark Zusman, the computer is being used to upgrade the Soviets' Backfire bomber.

The Russians originally wanted a super-Univac, supposedly to help Tass in its coverage of the Olympic Games. Administration advisers warned against the sale. After initially vetoing the Soviets' purchase, Carter okayed the sale of a scaled-down version of the computer.

So to give U.S. businessmen a few lucrative contracts, and to promote the now-shredded hope of detente, the United States has given the communists the one thing they lacked in their arsenal of aggression—American know-how.

Scuttlebucks—The White House is mulling over a proposal by Rep. John Murphy (D-N.Y.) to close all U.S. ports to Soviet merchant ships—an economic sanction that would hit the Russians hard in the pocketbook. A CIA analysis estimates that in 1977, the Soviet merchant fleet earned nearly \$1 billion in hard currency for the Kremlin—second only to the income from oil, gold and timber sales.

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ON PAGE A1-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 February 1980

Experts Assessing Spy Satellites for Hill

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Select Intelligence Committee, worried that the U.S. ability to keep a spy satellite watch over the Soviet Union may be slipping away, has formed a prestigious panel of outside experts to assess government policy in this area.

Though the panel was formed, and held its first meeting, more than a year ago, its existence has never been made public, Senate sources acknowledge.

Its formation, reliable sources report, reflects a variety of concerns within the committee. These range from fear that electronic eyes of U.S. satellites could be blinded by the Soviets in a crisis without any U.S. backup capability, to a feeling that reorganization of the nation's intelligence apparatus two years ago may have stifled inventiveness in an important field and one in which the United States has always led.

The move by the committee to set up a panel of experts, sources say, also reflects in part the vacuum in independent assessments on such issues that has existed since President Carter abolished the longstanding Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as part of the intelligence reorganization.

The disbanding of the group of leading civilian authorities — who were supposed to keep watch on the Central Intelligence Agency — was sharply criticized by some at the time. And now, specialists say, there is nothing to replace it.

Included in the new committee panel, sources report, are William O. Baker, recently retired president of Bell Laboratories, who was a member of the advisory board; the former top Air Force civilian official direct-

ing reconnaissance satellite programs, Alexander Flax, now head of the Institute for Defense Analysis; two former CIA deputies, Carl Duckett and Donald Steininger; Frank Lindsey, chairman of the board of Itel Corp.; Dr. Sidney Drell, deputy director of Stanford University's linear accelerator, and Richard Garwin of IBM.

The letter asking them to participate was signed by Intelligence Committee Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) and Vice Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) as an expression of bipartisan concern, sources say.

Bayh, in particular, congressional aides say, is reported to be interested in building a greater backup capability in strategic reconnaissance.

For example, other sources say that when the 1973 Middle East war broke out, the Soviets had one intelligence-gathering satellite in orbit able to watch and photograph some of what was going on below. Within two weeks, there were six such Soviet satellites in orbit. The Soviets' ability to put so many additional satellites in space so quickly stunned U.S. observers.

Panelists are studying whether the United States also should have some standby capability to restore spaceborne intelligence-gathering quickly if the Soviets, with antisatellite weapons, were able to blind viewing devices of U.S. craft watching such things as missile or troop movements.

At the moment, they say, there is no quick way to do this, and they are looking into how vulnerable the U.S. satellites may be to attack and ways to overcome it.

One way might be to send satellites into orbit for only a short time so that Soviet ground stations cannot track them long enough to get an accurate shot.

There also is study of how best to use the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration's space shuttle for intelligence purposes, if necessary.

Furthermore, there reportedly is concern about U.S. battlefield commanders in Europe, who now get much of their intelligence information via satellite, and what would happen if this were suddenly stopped. This also has put new emphasis on aircraft and unmanned camera-carrying drones. But space, sources say, is the main focus of concern.

Existing U.S. satellites, which are vital for giving the president accurate information so that he doesn't fire retaliatory missiles too late or too early, are highly sophisticated and widely estimated to be better than their Soviet counterparts.

But the feeling on the committee, sources say, is that the administration is no longer taking new initiatives in the intelligence field and that the committee may want to challenge this if there are legitimate grounds.

Sources say that, as good as U.S. satellites are, there has not been much new in recent years, and nothing major in sight comparable to the innovativeness of the past. There was intense activity in the U.S. space program for 15 years between the latter 1950s and the early 1970s. It may be that there are no more bright ideas, but it seems too dangerous to accept that, one source said.

The committee is said to be concerned that one reason for this situation is that the system is throttling new ideas.

In this view, the federal intelligence reorganization two years ago that centralized budgeting authority for a variety of satellite programs within the CIA has caused a bureaucracy to form over it.

A Defense Department official who works in satellite systems corroborates this judgment, saying that red tape and bureaucracy is now so rampant that it is almost impossible for managers to be technically creative.

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
24 January 1980

Carter: Toughening up abroad . . .

Jarred by events in Iran and Afghanistan, President Carter viewed the State of the Union in a global perspective Wednesday night. He delivered a tough but generally temperate speech aimed chiefly at countering these new threats to America's well-being and to world stability. Carter's concern and approach appear basically correct. The test will be adroit implementation.

What emerged from the speech is indeed the "Carter Doctrine." For the first time, an American president has explicitly recognized the Persian Gulf region, with its vast oil reserves, as absolutely vital to Western security.

And Carter rightly issued a clear warning, declaring that any attempt "by an outside force" to gain control in the Gulf will be viewed as "an assault on the vital interests of the United States to be repelled by any means necessary including military force."

The threat was aimed at the Soviet Union and was plainly justified — given the massive Soviet military thrust into Afghanistan and the continuing political chaos in Iran that might invite further Soviet adventures. The difficulty will be in giving that warning sensible substance.

Carter is counting on beefed-up American military power to project US presence and protect American interests in the Gulf. Certainly some steps in that direction are needed. US naval power, the best means of demonstrating American muscle and keeping it under strict control, presently is stretched thin. In order to forcefully show the flag in the Indian Ocean, the US has had to severely cripple its naval strength in the areas of the Mediterranean Sea and the Western Pacific.

Accelerated naval construction and better capabilities for rapidly airlifting troops to trouble spots are needed. Carter has advocated those steps as part of his request for a 5% real increase in the military budget, a hefty new allocation of scarce resources to defense spending.

Here we urge caution. Congress should not view a big percentage increase in the defense budget as the best measure of US military preparedness. More dollars alone won't buy security. The key to security remains properly shaping America's military machine so that it is responsive to US foreign policy goals. It may be quite possible to achieve those ends for considerably less than a 5% budget boost.

Similarly, Congress should proceed with care on the president's request to unleash the CIA for covert operations. America needs good, reliable intelligence and sometimes it needs to undertake clandestine operations. But the CIA also requires firm presidential and congressional oversight.

Nor should Congress equate the president's call for draft registration with renewal of the draft itself. Registration should be viewed as a contingency step. A draft is not required now.

Finally, the nation shouldn't forget that diplomacy is as important as military might for maintaining influence in the Gulf. The situation in Iran is a pointed example. Carter stated quite correctly that the US would not give in to blackmail. Yet turning to military force in Iran could not only leave the American hostages dead, but also drive Iran into the Soviets' arms.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR
3 February 1980

'Cover' for the CIA

One of the prickly issues, as Congress moves to frame a charter for U.S. foreign intelligence, is whether the Central Intelligence Agency should be barred by law from recruiting journalists, clergymen and academics as "agents."

It may depend on how you define an agent. But the usual case for total prohibition is that the recruitment of a newsman, priest or professor to a covert intelligence role contaminates all others by association. The argument is not without merit.

And yet, practically speaking, there are only a limited number of "covers" for intelligence agents. If you concede what seems to us inescapable — that the U.S. must have an effective intelligence capacity — it is self-defeating to cramp it by arbitrarily ruling out certain forms of cover.

But what, you may ask, of the *ethics* of professionals who consent to act as "spies"? And what about supposed professionals who are primarily intelligence agents to begin with?

Most of us would say that it depends on the urgency of the need. It would be difficult, on the one hand, to proclaim aloud the recruitment by the CIA of any given number of newsmen or

clergymen as agents. It would be more difficult, on the other hand, to object if some undercover agent, posing as a clergyman, say, had been admitted to the U.S. embassy compound in Tehran sometime in the past 80 days and had stumbled upon intelligence making it possible to secure the release of the American hostages there. Which is only to say the obvious — that emergencies tend to write their own codes of law and ethics.

Our own view is that rigid legal sanctions of the sort which the Carter administration is trying to avoid would indeed be a mistake — which is not to say that the professions need take a relaxed view of the practice. By long American custom, the protection of professional standards is more the concern of the professions themselves than it is of the law. If collaboration in intelligence-gathering is unprofessional — and it probably would be so regarded by many — it should be barred by professional sanctions. That would suffice in routine cases. It would leave room for the extraordinary cases — if the law remained silent, as we believe it should, on the subject.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
25 January 1980

... Or For CIA Dirty Tricks

At one point in his State of the Union address to Congress, President Carter asked for a solution to a problem that, at least on the face of things, does not exist. Speaking of the intelligence agencies, he said "we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence." But there are no restraints on the ability to collect intelligence.

After the exposure of monstrous abuses by the Central Intelligence Agency — mail-opening, bribery, lethal drug experiments, conspiracies against elected governments, secret wars and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders — Congress enacted one reform, known as the Hughes-Ryan amendment. That amendment simply required (1) that additional congressional committees be apprised in advance of CIA covert operations (committee approval was not required) and (2) that covert operations

not be carried out unless specifically approved by the president.

No case has been made that either of these restraints inhibited intelligence gathering with respect to Afghanistan, Iran or any other place. Although the CIA's intelligence on Iran before the fall of the shah was notoriously poor, the agency's performance was inept because of self-imposed restraints. (In fact, Washington had adequate intelligence on Iran from Israeli sources, and paid no attention.)

The campaign to repeal the Hughes-Ryan amendment is not based on any showing that it would improve intelligence-gathering — which is certainly important. Rather, it seems founded on a desire to put the CIA back in the business of dirty tricks — which have caused the U.S. to be hated around the world and which are a reprehensible means of carrying out national policy.

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MOBILE PRESS (AL.)
13 January 1980

CIA critics to blame for Mideast problems

The American government, principally President Carter, his State Department and Congress, must shoulder a great deal of the blame for our present problems in India and Afghanistan.

These are the culprits who set in motion the events which have resulted in the imprisonment of 50 American hostages in Tehran and the enslavement of an entire nation, Afghanistan, by invading hordes of Russians.

It all started in 1974 when former Sen. Harold Hughes of Iowa and the late Rep. Leo Ryan of California tacked an amendment on to the Foreign Assistance Act which requires the CIA to inform Congress of its secret operations. The amendment was approved without hearings following a long period of congressional and media criticism of alleged CIA excesses in its covert operations.

Subsequent to that irresponsible action by Congress, the CIA has been handcuffed. Recognizing that to inform Congress of its secret operations is the same as announcing its activities over CBS, NBC, ABC and in the Washington Post and New York Times, the CIA adopted a low profile.

This laid the groundwork for the Iranian revolution in which the shah was ousted and the Ayatollah Khomeini elevated to power.

Without the shah and his strong military force in Iran, the Soviet Union could not resist the temptation to invade Afghanistan and spread communism several hundred miles closer to the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

These developments will probably continue so long as the CIA is leashed by Congress and maligned by the liberal media.

A study published this past week by the Ethics and Public Policy Center accurately notes that the CIA has almost been put out of business by the 1974 law giving every member of Congress potential veto power over clandestine operations.

The study points out that under the terms of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, 30 senators and congressmen are in a position to be informed about covert operations. However, "as a practical matter, this means that about 25 staff members share in this information and, under the rules of the two houses, any individual member who wants to know about such operation may have access to the information as well."

Since it is common knowledge that scores of congressmen and even more congressional staffers still ignorantly maintain the CIA and FBI on the top of their "hit" list, there is for all practical purposes no such thing as a clandestine operation any longer — for which the KGB, among others, is most appreciative.